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Abstract
Part I of this Note will describe the need for anti-fraud measures within the Community.
Part I will also detail the various legislative actions taken by the Commission, the Parliament and
Council, and by the ECB and by the EIB to combat fraud. Part II will present the Commission’s
case against the ECB, the ECB’s defense, the views expressed by Advocate General Jacobs and
the ultimate judgment of the ECJ. Part II will focus primarily on the Commission v. ECB, but
will note similarities and variances from the Commission’s case against the EIB. Finally, Part III
will discuss the leeway afforded to fraud prevention within the EC, the fundamental basis of ECB
independence, and the impetus of the ECJ’s decision regarding the nature of ECB independence
and to some degree EIB independence.
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MOVING FORWARD, NEVER BACKWARDS: PREVENTING
FRAUD IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND DEFINING
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
Shaun A. Reader*
INTRODUCTION
Lord Cockfield aptly stated that "the Community always
goes forward; never backwards ....
At times progress may be
slow to the point where it appears almost to have stopped: but in
due time progress will be resumed."' Fraud and corruption acted as sand in the gears of European Union ("EU" or "the Community") progress through most of the 1990s and threatened to
halt its evolution towards a monetary alliance. 2 In response, the
Community at Century's close, prioritized fraud prevention to a
degree that created a distinct tension with the vision of the framers of the Economic and Monetary Union fifty years before
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University Law School; Writing & Research Editor, Vol. XXVIII, Fordham International Law Journal. I would like to thank Professor
RogerJ. Goebel, Neil Dennis, Michel Paradis, Michele Totah and Sandra Valdivieso for
providing invaluable guidance and criticism through the wonderful process of writing
this piece. I would also like to thank my mother for her undying love and support and
being such a positive influence in my life and an inspiration to all that know her, and
also to my father for his unwaivering love and support.
1. See Noni Vacondiou, The Role of the European Central Bank Towards the European
Monetary Union, at http://www.calavros.com/ecb.htm (Jan. 11, 1999).
2. See House of Lords Select Committee on European Communities, Fraud Against
the Community, H.L. 27, (Feb. 21, 1989) [hereinafter Select Committee Report] at 205
(recognizing that huge sums being lost due to fraud and irregularity against Community are all bore by taxpayers and traders of Europe). "This strikes at the roots of democratic societies, based as they are on the rule of law and its enforcement, and is a public
scandal." Id. See also Council Resolution, O.J. C 15/410 (1990) (reporting on progress
towards European Union); Ann Sherlock & Christopher Harding, Controlling Fraud
Within the European Community, 16(1) EUR. L. REv. 20 (1991) (discussing suspected
sources of fraud and corruption within Community). See generally OLAF Supervisory
Committee Progress Report No. 1/1999 from July 1999 to July 2000, O.J. C 360, at 1 in
Chapter 2(c)(1) (2000) [hereinafter Report No. 1/1999] (discussing historical background of fraud in Community leading up to creation of UCLAF and eventually
OLAF); Court of Auditors Special Report, O.J. C 215 (1985) [hereinafter Special Report] (noting types of transactions that may encourage fraud especially in payment of
refunds on agricultural exports).
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them.3 These framers inserted in the Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") 4 a high and precisely defined
level of independence for the European System of Central Banks
("ESCB") and, likewise, for the ESCB's central body, the European Central Bank ("ECB"). 5 The tug-of-war between central3. See Commission Decision No. 1999/352/EC, O.J. L 136, at 20 (1999) [hereinafter Decision 1999/352] (establishing European Anti-Fraud Office ("OLAF")). See also
Council Regulation No. 1073/1999, O.J. L 136, at 1 (1999) [hereinafter Regulation
1073/1999] (concerning investigations conducted by OLAF); Interinstitutional Agreement of Parliament, Council and Commission, O.J. L 136, at 15 (1999) [hereinafter
Interinstitutional Agreement] (concerning internal investigations by European AntiFraud Office (OLAF) within Parliament, Council, and Commission); Willi Rothley and
Others v. Parliament, Case T-17/00, [2000] E.C.R. II-2085(ruling on Amendment to
Rules of Procedure of Parliament and holding that neither Protocol on Privileges and
Immunities nor Parliament's amended Rules of Procedure protected Parliament Members' rights of privacy regarding OLAF investigations); Parliament Decision concerning
investigation conducted by OLAF, Oj. L 202, 1 (1999) [hereinafter EP amendment]
(adding Article 9a to Parliament's Rules of Procedure concerning Internal investigations conducted by OLAF); Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-1 1/00, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 167 (summarizing Decision de la
Cour de Justice du 26 octobre 1999 relative aux conditions et modalites des enquetes internes en
matiere de lutte contre la fraude, la corruptionet toute activite illegale prejudiciableaux interets
des Communautes [Decision of ECJ on October 26, 1999 relating to conditions and procedures of OLAF in investigating corruption and illegal activities detrimental to financial interests of Community]). This Decision is available only in French and has not
been published in the Official Journal. Id.
4. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J.
C 325/33 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporating
changes made by EC Treaty of Nice amending the EC Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Feb. 26,
2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter EC Treaty of Nice] (amending EC Treaty on
European Union ("TEU"), EC Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty"), EC Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC EC
Treaty"), and EC Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
("Euratom EC Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and Consolidated EC Treaty).
5. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77 (2002),
37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (barring members of ECB decision-making bodies
from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies). See also
Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, art. 7, O.J. C 191/68 (1992) [hereinafter ESCB/ECB Statute] (repeating Article 108 EC). In Les Vertsjudgmrent, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") referred to EC Treaty and other constitutive treaties as
"constitutional charter," leading commentators to acknowledge ECB independence as a
"constitutional principle." Parti &ologiste Les Verts v. Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986]
E.C.R. 1339, 1365. It is important to note that the Monetary Union was not created as a
separate structure under the overarching TEU such as Common Foreign and Security
Policy, also created by the Treaty of Maastricht. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4,
tit. V, O.J. C 325/33, at 61 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 92 (enumerating provisions on common
foreign and security policy); id. art. 268, O.J. C 325/33, at 140 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 149
(ex Article 199) (allowing expenditures relating to common foreign and security to be
charged to EU budget); Terence, Fokas, Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: The
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ized fraud prevention and ECB independence culminated in a
court battle that the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") ultimately resolved, delimiting ECB independence and solidifying
the judiciary's own position as final arbiter of such disputes.6
By the 1990s, economists viewed independent central banks
such as the German Bundesbank and the American Federal Reserve Board as having been highly successful in delivering stable
and steady monetary growth.7 Thus, the ECB was created in May
1998 and commenced operations on January 1, 1999,8 with a
Legal Framework and Implicationsfor Contractual Obligations, 36 FALL TEX. J. Bus. L. 2, 18
(1999) (Comparing structure of ECB and ESCB with U.S. Federal Reserve System and
its system of Regional District Banks).
6. See Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-1 1/00, [2003] E.C.R. _ (deciding whether ECB Anti-Fraud Decision could co-exist with Regulation 1073/1999).
See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 230, 232, 233, 234, and 237, O.J. C
325/33, at 126-28 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 125-26 (stating that ECJ has jurisdiction over
disputes between institutions, bodies, and governments of Community); Roger J. Goebel, European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?, 4 COL. J. EUR. L. 249,
at 295 (discussing dual role of ECJ in European Monetary Union's ("EMU") operations).
7. See Laurence Gormley & Jakob De Haan, The Democratic Deficit of the European
Central Bank, 21 EuR. L. REv. 95 (1996) (examining Central Bank autonomy and democratic accountability of European Central Bank ("ECB") by reference to German
Bundesbank, Dutch Central Bank and Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and by reference
to economic theory). See also LORENZO BINISMAGHI & DANIEL GROS, OPEN ISSUES IN
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANKING 125-28 (St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000) (testing effectiveness
of central bank independence and formulation of monetary policy); Nigel Healey et al.,
The PoliticalEconomy of a European CentralBank, available at http://www.ecsanet.org/con
ferences/ecsaworld2/Healey.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2003) (discussing intent and wisdom of politically independent central bank); RENE SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTs, 152-54 (1997) (citing studies that correlate central
bank independence in Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland with low inflation rates
and smaller national deficits); Goebel, supra note 6, at 288 (discussing reasons for
strong statement of ECB independence); Rosa Lastra, The Independence of the European
System of Central Banks, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 475, 477 (1992) (arguing that central bank
independence combats manipulation of monetary policies by short-cited politicians,
and that expertise and superior economic qualifications of central bankers provide
more objective and faster decision-making process than if left to politicians); Piet-Jan
Slot, The Institutional Provisions of the EMU, in 2 INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 231 (Deirdre Curtin & Ton Henkels eds., 1995) (acknowledging impressive track-record of Bundesbank and Dutch Central Bank in maintaining price stability).
8. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 116(3), O.J. C 325/33, at 81
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 103 (ex Article 109e) (listing provisions that shall apply from beginning of third stage including articles pertaining to ESCB and ECB). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 121(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 85 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 105
(ex Article 109j) (settingJanuary 1, 1999 as date in which third stage of creating Monetary Union shall begin).
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strong statement of independence. 9 Although the EC Treaty
does not specifically list the ECB among the political and judicial
institutions of the Community," it is distinguished from other
European Community ("EC") agencies and bodies by a separate
"legal personality."" An Executive Board and Governing Council function as the ECB's primary "decision-making bodies."' 2
The Executive Board is comprised of the President, the Vice
President, and four other members, which deal primarily with
the daily business of the ECB."3 The Governing Council consists
9. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77 (2002),
37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (barring members of ECB decision-making bodies
from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies). See also
ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5 (repeating Article 108 EC). In Les Verts judgment,
ECJ referred to EC Treaty and other constitutive treaties as "constitutional charter"
leading commentators to acknowledge ECB independence as "constitutional principle." Parti 6cologiste Les Verts v. Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339, 1365. It
is important to note that Monetary Union was not created as separate structure under
overarching TEU such as Common Foreign and Security Policy, also created by Treaty
of Maastricht. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, tit. V, O.J. C 325/33, at 61
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 192 (enumerating provisions on common foreign and security policy); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 268, O.J. C 325/33, at 140 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 149 (ex Article 199) (allowing expenditures relating to common foreign and
security to be charged to EU budget).
10. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 7, O.J. C 325/33, at 42 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 81 (ex Article 4) (listing Commission, Council, Parliament, Court of Justice
and Court of Auditors as institutions entrusted with tasks of Community).
11. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 107(2) and (3), O.J. C 325/33, at
76 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 106) (giving ECB legal personality). See also
ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 9.1. See also European Parliament Report A5-0409
2001 Final on Legal Personality of EU, (2001/2021 (INI)) (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Report A5-0409) (stating that legal personality of EU implies that Community may, as
legal person, conclude agreements with non-member countries and international organizations, be held liable under international law, and take action where their rights are
infringed).
12. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 107(3), O.J. C 325/33, at 76
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 106) (establishing Executive Board and Governing
Council to act as ECB's decision-making bodies). See also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra
note 5, art. 9.1; Jonathan A.C. Wise, Variable Geometry and the European CentralBank: How
the ECB Can Assert Itself Against Attacks From Member States With Derogations, 20 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 407, 413 (1997) (discussing structure and function of ECB and ESCB
governance); J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr., EMU and the Role of the NationalCentral Banks in the
Eurosystem, 1 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 61, 71 (2000) (suggesting that ECB Governing
Council, with its National Central Bank ("NCB") Governor majority, must act to
strengthen ECB to create clear sense of leadership at center of monetary policy-making).
13. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 112(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 78
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 101 (ex Article 109a) (specifying that designation of initial Executive Board be made by common accord of participating Member States only, and that
they may decide to limit its initial membership to four or five, rather than six). See also
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of the Executive Board and the Governors of the participating
Member State central banks 4 and functions as the regular decision-making body whose decisions are generally carried out by
the National Central Banks ("NCBs").
The ECB's primary objective is to maintain price stability; 6
a term not defined in the EC Treaty, but commonly understood
to mean keeping consumer prices from rising at a high inflation
rate. 7 The ECB also has the secondary tasks of designing the
ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, arts. 11.1, 11.2, 12.1 (enumerating construct of Executive Board); Slot, supra note 7, at 235 (observing that "daily business" managed by
Executive Board, often impacts monetary policy); Wise, supra note 12, at 414 (describing ECB Executive Board's function as implementing monetary policy in accordance
with decisions and guidelines laid down by ECB Governing Council).
14. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 112(1), O.J. C 325/33, at 78
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 101 (ex Article 109a) (describing composition of Governing Council). See also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 10.1 (laying out structure of ECB
Governing Council). See also Broaddus, supra note 12, at 70 (recognizing that all NCB
Governors being permanent voting members of Governing Council, creating voting majority, is unlike principal monetary policy-making body in Fed, Federal Open Market
Committee ("FOMC"), where voting Reserve Bank presidents are in permanent minority).
15. See SMITS, supra note 7, at 92-115 (describing complex provision on structure
and role of ESCB and ECB). See also Goebel, supra note 6, at 276 (discussing similarity
of ECB structure to German Bundesbank and U.S. Federal Reserve); Wise, supra note
12, at 414 (noting that ECB Governing Council formulates Community monetary policy
including decisions relating to intermediate monetary objectives, key interest rates and
supply of reserves); Broaddus, supra note 12, at 64-66 (relating decision-making process
and functions of U.S. Federal Reserve Board Chairman to Reserves success at maintaining price stability).
16. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(1), O.J. C 325/33, at 75
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (setting primary objective of ESCB as maintaining price stability while concurrently supporting Community objectives). See also
ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 2 (restating ECB primary objective as maintaining
price stability); Fokas, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that ECB Governing Council is responsible for formulating monetary policy within euro-zone, which includes setting
monetary objectives and interest rates, adopting operational guidelines, formulating
ECB's internal structure and ensuring that participating NCBs comply with ECB guidelines).
17. See ECB Working Paper No. 273, Definition of Price Stability, Range and Point
Inflation Targets: The Anchoring of Long-Term Inflation Expectations (Sept. 2003), available
at www.ecb.int/pub/wp/ecbwp273.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (correlating concept
of maintaining price stability with sustaining low inflation rate, and defining low inflation rate as keeping Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices ("HICP") below 2%). See
also Sven-Olov Daunfeldt & Xavier de Luna, Central Bank Independence and PriceStability,
available at http://www.econ.umu.se/ues/ues589.pdf (June 6, 2003) (defining price
stability as period when inflation remains in specific range for five-year period); Niall
Lenihan, The Role and Framework of the European System of CentralBanks, 1090 PLI/CoRP.
463, at 466 (1998) (noting that price stability has been defined by ECB as year-on-year
increase in HICP of below 2% maintained over medium term).
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Community monetary policy, i s conducting foreign exchange, 9
managing the official foreign reserves of the Member States,2 °
and promoting smooth operation of payment systems. 2 1 In carrying out its operations, the ECB is restricted only by the fact
that it must act within the limits of the EC Treaty and the Statute
22
of the ESCB and of the ECB.
These broad limitations reflect the drafters' intent to insulate members of the ECB's Executive Board and Governing
Council from potential political pressure. 23 Accordingly, Article
108 EC strongly prohibits members of these bodies from seeking
or taking instructions from Community institutions or Member
States.24 Likewise, Community institutions and Member State
18. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 75
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (enumerating secondary (or basic) tasks of
ESCB).
19. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 75
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (listing secondary tasks of ESCB and ECB).
Note, however, that Council retained extensive authority over setting foreign exchange
rate policy that is binding on ECB. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 111,
O.J. C 325/33, at 78 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 101 (ex Article 109) (retaining extensive authority over setting foreign exchange rate policy with Council). See also Slot, supra note
7, at 240 (describing ECB's position in setting foreign exchange rate policy as "somewhere between consultation and assent"); Goebel, supra note 6, at 285-86 (discussing
powers retained by Council regarding foreign exchange rate policy).
20. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 75
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (specifying secondary tasks of ESCB and ECB).
21. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 75
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (enumerating secondary tasks of ESCB and ECB
in addition to primary task of maintaining price stability).
22. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8, Oj. C 325/33, at 42(2002), 37
I.L.M. at 81 (ex Article 4a) (stating that ECB must act within limits of EC Treaty).
23. See Alexandre Lamfalussy, The European Central Bank: Independent and Accountable, Keynote speech at Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, available at www.
ecb.int/emi/key/key05.htm (May 13, 1997). Lamfalussy,former President of European
Monetary Institute, noted that independence of ESCB marks its credibility and effectiveness in maintaining price stability in euro-zone. Id. See also Ian Harden, The European CentralBank and the Role of National CentralBanks in Economic and Monetary Union, in
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY-MAKERS 149, 15961 (Klaus Gretschmann ed., 1993) (pointing out policy motivation for balancing independent central bank with removal from political pressures to enable extensive leeway
in developing monetary policy); Karl Otto Pohl, Basic Features of a European Monetary
Order, in EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 79, 85 (P. Welfens ed., 2d ed. 1994)
(describing central bank without independence from political considerations as "tiger
without teeth"); SMITs, supra note 7, at 156 (describing motive for central bank independence to be freeing incumbents from political considerations concerning renewal
of his or her term of office); Wise, supra note 12, at 415 (arguing that central bankers
work more efficiently when not influenced by partisan political pressures).
24. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77 (2002),
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governments are barred from seeking to influence the members
of the ECB, 25 thus locking the door from both sides. 26 Further
testament to the removal of the Executive Board and Governing
Council from the popularity of monetary decisions, Board and
Council members are limited to non-renewable eight-year
terms. 27 Moreover, they may only be removed from office for
incapacity or "serious misconduct" in a proceeding held before
the ECJ 2 1 to ensure further that their removal is strictly judicial
rather than political. Finally, the ECB has its own financial resources and does not depend on any EC institution for its
29
budget.
Some economists have queried, however, whether such
strong central bank independence in the EC Treaty would have
been better left to secondary legislation"° and have raised the
37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (barring members of ECB decision-making bodies
from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies). See also
ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 7 (repeating Article 108 EC).
25. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77 (2002),
37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (prohibiting members of Community institutions and
bodies and Member State governments from seeking to influence ECB decision-makers). See also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 7 (repeating Article 108 EC).
26. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77 (2002),
37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (referring to fact that ECB decision-makers cannot
seek nor take instructions from neither Member States nor from Community institutions and bodies; and, likewise, Member States and Community institutions and bodies
cannot seek to influence ECB decision-makers). See also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note
5, art. 7 (repeating Article 108 EC).
27. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 112(2)(b), O.J. C 325/33, at 78
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 101 (ex Article 109a) (setting term limits for Governing Council
members). See also SMITS, supra note 7, at 156 (describing motive of central bank independence to be freeing incumbents from political considerations concerning renewal
of his or her term of office).
28. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art 11.4 (stating methods of removing
members of Governing Council or Executive Board from office). See also SMITS, supra
note 7, at 163 (analyzing need to remove ECB from potential political pressures regarding decision-makers' job security); Goebel, supra note 6, at 288 (discussing notion of
ECB decision-makers' freedom from political influence).
29. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, arts. 28-30 (naming ECB's resources as
shareholder contributions from NCBs and from income generated through ECB and
NCB business)
30. See Goebel, supra note 6, at 292 (discussing varied views regarding ECB independence embodied in EC Treaty). See also Francis Snyder, EMU-MetaphorforEuropean
Union-Institutions, Rules and Types of Regulation, in EUROPE AFrER MAASTRICHT: AN EVER

CLOSER UNION? 78 (Renaud Dehousse ed., 1994) (noting that while Bundesbank and
U.S. Federal Reserve have been successful at delivering low inflation, neither enjoys as
much independence as ECB); Lastra, supra note 7, at 495 (commenting on fact that
Chancellor Kohl's government overruled Bundesbank in monetary policy for German
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issue that the ECB's operational structure suffers from a democratic deficit. 3 ' Thus, the EC Treaty secures the ECJ's role both
in protecting ECB independence but also in providing a check
on the ECB's power.3 2
reunification in 1990); Gormley & de Haan, supra note 7, at 109-12 (noting that economic theory mayjustify political override of central bank decisions in rare instances of
economic shocks). But see SMITs, supra note 7, at 176, 185 n.161 (conceding that ECB
independence has been "written in stone" but noting that alternative is "unacceptable
politically" because of high concern for price stability with managing new currency).
31. See Resolution on Economic and Monetary Union, O.J. C 304, 43, 45 (1989)
(demanding procedures for democratic supervision of ESCB). See also Resolution on
Economic and Monetary Union, O.J. C 149, at 66, 68 (1990) (urging "public accountability" of ESCB as appropriate "in a democratically ordered society"); Resolution on
Economic and Monetary Union, O.J. C 284, at 62, 63-65 (1990) (urging that Parliament
be given either power to assent, or share in codecision procedure in key decisions for
creation of EMU and legal status of ECU, and give its assent to nomination of ECB
board members); European Commission, Working Paper on Economic and Monetary
Union: Economic Rationale and Design of the System, at 8 (Mar. 1990), summarized in
E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 8-9 (1990) (recommending that ESCB have high level of independence but also remain accountable); Christa Randzio-Plath, A New PoliticalCulture in the
EU: Democratic Accountability of the ECB, available at http://www.zei.de (Mar. 8, 2000)
(noting that ECB accountability must counterbalance its independence); Gormley & de
Haan, supra note 7, at 112 (strongly voicing view that elected officials must control
monetary policy, discussing lack of accountability in independent central bank); Snyder, supra note 30, at 77 (raising concern of public legitimacy of independent central
bank); SMiTs, supra note 7, at 169 (urging Parliament's use of its surveillance powers to
achieve "democratic accountability" because ECB must be accountable to political institutions and also come under scrutiny ofjudiciary); Chiara Zilioli & Martin Selmayr, The
European Central Bank: An Independent Specialized Organization of Community Law, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 519 (2000) (recognizing that self-image of ECB as separate from rest
of Community adds to attempts to maximize its autonomy and arguing that Member
States did not transfer monetary control to Community but rather directly to ECB);
Ernest A. Young, ProtectingMember State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary
Tales From American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1612, 1704-05 (2002) (drawing parallels
with development of European Union ("EU") with early Federalism within United
States and noting that like early United States, roles of institutions of EU will evolve and
become more clearly defined over time); Barbara Dutzler, OLAF or the Question of Secondary Community Law to the ECB, at 14, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2001-001.
pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2003) (arguing that title of EC Treaty is indication of drafters'
intent to define all aspects of Community, including ECB as part of that Community).
But seeRamon Torrent, To Whom is the European CentralBank the central bank of. Reaction
to Zilioli and Selmayr, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1229, at 1233 (1999) (recognizing that
ECB's legal personality does not place it "outside of the Community").
32. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 230, 232-34, 237, O.J. C 325/33,
at 126-28 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 125-26 (stating that ECJ has jurisdiction over disputes
between institutions, bodies, and governments of Community). See also ESCB/ECB
Statute, supra note 5, art. 11.4 (allowing ECJ to compulsory retire, on application by
Governing Council or Executive Board, member of Executive board for "serious misconduct"); Goebel, supra note 6, at 295 (discussing dual role of ECJ in European Monetary Union's ("EMU") operations); Slot, supra note 7, at 248 (acknowledging that TEU
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The EC Treaty created another important bank, the European Investment Bank ("EIB"),"3 with a distinct legal identity
similar to the ECB.14 The EIB, established in 1958, provides sub35
stantial amounts of loans for projects and other investments.
The tasks of the EIB are broadly defined by the EC Treaty as
contributing to the development of the common market in the
interest of the Community.3 6 Unlike the ECB, the EIB's independence is not explicitly mentioned in the EC Treaty, but has
been primarily derived from case law.3 7 The EIB maintains its
own budget from independent resources, usually borrowing
long-term on the Euro-market and deriving interest from its own
loans. 8 The Court of Auditors' right to access of information
into EIB activities is limited to those funded by Community exprovides greater judicial protection and control than exists in many Member States,
which may counterbalance lack of Parliamentary control).
33. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 9, O.J. C 325/33, at 42 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 81 (ex Article 4b) (creating EIB to act within limits conferred by EC Treaty).
34. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 266, OJ. C 325/33, at 139
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 132 (ex Article 198d) (bestowing EIB with legal personality).
35. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 267, O.J. C 325/33, at 139-40
(2002), 37 1.L.M. at 132 (ex Article 198e) (giving power to grant loans and give guarantees facilitating financing of projects that develop less-developed regions, projects modernizing or developing progressive activities that are not otherwise financed by Member
States, and projects that are in interest of several Member States). EIB contributes to
40% of European Investment Fund ("EIF"), set up in 1994 to provide long-term guarantees for financing Trans-European Networks ("TENs") projects and for small and medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs"). Jozsef Feiler & Magda Stoczkiewicz, The European Investment Bank: Accountability Only to the Market?, A Report by the CEE Bankwatch Network (Dec. 1999), available at www.bankwatch.org/publications/studies/eib/eibl.html.
36. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 267, O.J. C 325/33, at 139-40
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 132 (ex Article 198e) (defining tasks, function, and purpose of EIB
within Community framework).
37. See Commission v. Council of Governors of the EIB, Case C-85/86, [1988]
E.C.R. 1281 (ruling on legal status of EIB and rejecting idea that EIB was third party to
Community). See also Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, Council of Governors of
the EIB, [1988] E.C.R. 1281 (noting that EIB was meant only to be independent in its
decision-making, stating there is no doubt of nature of Bank as being autonomous segment of "organizational machinery" of Community and that arguments to contrary
have much lower profile than Bank maintains, and noting significance of title and preamble (if any) of piece of legislation for purposes of identifying its most characteristic
subject-matter); SGEEM and Roland Etroy v. EIB, Case C-370/89, [1992] E.C.R. 6211,
at
15 (holding Community responsible for non-contractual liability of EIB, noting
that with regard to non-contractual liability term "institution" covers bodies such as
EIB).
38. See Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank, art. 4(1), O.J. L
173/14 (1993) [hereinafter EIB Statute] (providing that EIB shall derive capital from
subscription of Member States). See also Parliament Report No. A5-0364/2002 Final on
EIB Annual Report for 2001 (2001/2256(INI)) (outlining source and purpose of EIB
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penditures in order to provide the EIB with greater credibility in
39
the financial markets.
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, a member of the ECB Executive
Board and a well-known international economist,4" has pointed
out that independence is not an absolute notion, but is rather
tied to the task for which it has been granted.4 1 Consequently, if

the Community Banks abuse their independence and act outside
their stated area of expertise, then eventually the Community
will act to restrict their independence. 4

2

Padoa-Schioppa con-

cluded that if the Central Banks want to protect their independence, they must "know how to behave."4 3

In October of 1999, the ECB, believing it was behaving appropriately, established the Directorate for Internal Audit ("Dfunds noting that by virtue of EIB's top credit rating it is able to issue longer-term
bonds denominated in currencies of several countries inside and outside of EU).
39. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 248(1), (3), O.J. C 325/33, at
131-32 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 128 (ex Article 188c) (limiting Court of Auditors' control
over EIB's management of revenue and subjecting it to conditions agreed to by Commission, Court of Auditors and EIB).
40. See Euro Currency Room: Central Bank Profile, available at http://www.dailyfx.
com/currencyeuro.centralbank.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004). Tommaso PadoaSchioppa, Italian economist and member of ECB Executive Board who received most of
his professional experience at Banca d'Italia, is known as "intellectual impetus" behind
euro and "founding father" of new currency. Id. His many publications have covered
broader implications that Euro will have, both within and outside of euro-zone. Id. See
also The Members of the Decision-MakingBodies of the ECB, available at http://www.ecb.int
(last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
41. See Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, An Institutional Glossary of the Eurosystem, available at www.ecb.int/key/00/sp000308_1.htm (Mar. 8, 2000) (discussing notion and extent of central bank independence).
42. See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 41 (discussing notion and extent of central
bank independence). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 230, 232-34,
237, O.J. C 325/33, at 126-28 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 125-26 (stating that ECJ has jurisdiction over disputes between institutions, bodies and governments of Community).
43. See Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 41 (discussing notion and extent of central
bank independence). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8, O.J. C 325/
33, at 42 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 81 (ex Article 4a) (stating that ECB must act within limits
of EC Treaty). See e.g.,
id. art. 105, O.J. C 325/33, at 75 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex
Article 105) (enumerating primary and secondary tasks of ESCB and ECB); id. art. 2,
O.J. C 325/33, at 40 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 80 (ex Article 2) (stating objectives of Community as obtaining monetary union and non-inflationary growth); id. art. 4, O.J. C 325/
33, at 41 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 80 (ex Article 3a) (adding that Community's activities also
include fixing exchange rates aimed at greater price stability and explains that monetary policy conducted by ECB must support "general economic policies of the Community"); id. art. 111, O.J. C 325/33, at 78 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 101 (ex Article 109) (retaining extensive authority over setting foreign exchange rate policy with Council); Slot,
supra note 7, at 240 (describing ECB's position in setting foreign exchange rate policy
as "somewhere between consultation and assent").
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IA") to help combat fraud and other illegal activities detrimental
to the financial interests of the ECB. 44 The EIB President followed with a similar decision in November of 1999. 4" Both the
ECB's D-IA and the EIB's Anti-Fraud Decision came less than
seven months after the European Commission ("Commission")
established the European Anti-Fraud Office ("OLAF"), also for
the purpose of fighting fraud in the Community.4 6 In fact, the
Council of Ministers ("Council") and European Parliament
("Parliament") had, in May 1999, jointly adopted Regulation
1073/1999 granting OLAF the authority to investigate fraud and
other illegal activities within the institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the EC. 4 7 Not coincidentally, Regulation 1073/1999
followed soon after the Treaty of Amsterdam,48 which added paragraph 4 to Article 280 EC, granting the Council the necessary
power to adopt anti-fraud measures.4 9
The Commission believed both the ECB and EIB's antifraud decisions to be incompatible with the objectives of OLAF
and consequently sued both Banks for infringement of Regulation 1073/1999." 0 The resulting court battles would define
44. See European Central Bank Decision No. 1999/726/EC, O.J. L 291, at 36
(1999) [hereinafter ECB Decision] (creating Directorate for Internal Audit ("D-IA") to
combat fraud within ECB).
45. See Commission v. European Investment Bank, Case C-15/00, [2003] E.C.R. -,
at
42 [hereinafter EIB Decision] (communicating anti-fraud procedure to combat
fraud within EIB and limiting OLAF's authority in this regard). EIB's Anti-Fraud Decision has not been published, but an English version of it was communicated to Presidents of Parliament, Council, and Commission by the President of the EIB on November 16, 1999. Id.
46. Decision 1999/352, supra note 3 (establishing OLAF).
47. Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3 (concerning investigations conducted by
OLAF within Community bodies and institutions).
48. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, O.J. C 340/1 (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending TEU, EC Treaty, ECSC Treaty, and
Euratom Treaty and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
49. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 280(4), (3), O.J. C 325/33, at
146 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 136 (ex Article 209a) (allowing Council to adopt, in accordance with codecision procedure outlined in Article 251 EC and after consulting Court
of Auditors, necessary measures in fraud prevention that affects "financial interests of
the Community").
50. See Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R.
(deciding whether ECB Anti-Fraud Decision could co-exist with Regulation 1073/
1999). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _ (deciding whether EIB AntiFraud Decision could co-exist with Regulation 1073/1999); Regulation 1073/1999,
supra note 3 (establishing OLAF as Commission body to combat fraud within Community); ECB Decision, supra note 44 (creating D-IA to combat fraud within ECB); EIB
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more clearly the role of the Banks within the Community and
the scope of their independence. 5 t Not surprisingly, the ECJ
seized this opportunity for two reasons: to build confidence in
its role of judicial review and to enhance the overall confidence
in the European Monetary Union ("EMU") by making clear the
52
roles of its governing bodies.
Part I of this Note will describe the need for anti-fraud measures within the Community. Part I will also detail the various
legislative actions taken by the Commission, the Parliament and
Council, and by the ECB and by the EIB to combat fraud. Part II
will present the Commission's case against the ECB, the ECB's
defense, the views expressed by Advocate GeneralJacobs and the
ultimate judgment of the ECJ. Part II will focus primarily on the
Commission v. ECB but will note similarities and variances from
the Commission's case against the EIB.54 Finally, Part III will dis-

cuss the leeway afforded to fraud prevention within the EC, the
fundamental basis of ECB independence, and the impetus of the
ECJ's decision regarding the nature of ECB independence and
to some degree EIB independence.

Decision, supra note 45 (communicating anti-fraud procedure to combat fraud within
EIB and limiting OLAF's authority in this regard).
51. See Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. (deciding whether ECB Anti-Fraud Decision could co-exist with Regulation 1073/
1999). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. __ (deciding whether EIB AntiFraud Decision could co-exist with Regulation 1073/1999); Regulation 1073/1999,
supra note 3 (establishing OLAF as Commission body to combat fraud within Community); ECB Decision, supra note 44 (creating D-IA to combat fraud within ECB); EIB
Decision, supra note 45 (communicating anti-fraud procedure to combat fraud within
EIB and limiting OLAF's authority in this regard).
52. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 230, 232-34, 237, OJ. C 325/33,
at 126-28 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 125-26 (stating that ECJ has jurisdiction over disputes
between institutions, bodies, and governments of Community). See also ESCB/ECB
Statute, supra note 5, art. 11.4 (allowing ECJ to compulsory retire, on application by
Governing Council or Executive Board, member of Executive board for "serious misconduct"); Goebel, supra note 6, at 295 (discussing dual role of ECJ in European Monetary Union's ("EMU") operations); Slot, supra note 7, at 248 (acknowledging that TEU
provides greater judicial protection and control than exists in many Member States,
which may counterbalance lack of Parliamentary control).
53. European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _ (deciding whether ECB Anti-Fraud Decision could co-exist with Regulation 1073/1999).
54. European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _ (deciding whether EIB Anti-Fraud
Decision could co-exist with Regulation 1073/1999).
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I. LOOKING BACKWARDS: HISTORY OF FRAUD
AND FRAUD PREVENTION
A. Fraud within the Community
Since the inception of the EU, fraud has consistently undermined EC programs, particularly subsidies to farming or fishing
interests and regional aid, threatening citizen confidence." In
the early 1990s, the Commission estimated that fraud amounted
to as much as 10% of the total Community budget, while the
Community institutions had no mechanism for combating corruption or irregularities.5 6 The Commission had responded in
1987 when it established the Unit for Coordination of Fraud Prean office of the Commission that,
vention ("UCLAF"),
throughout most of the 1990s, wielded the Commission's growing authority in protecting the Community's financial interests.5
In 1998, however, the Parliament adopted a resolution urging
for a more independent, more effective UCLAF.5 9
55. See Select Committee Report, supra note 2, at 205 (recognizing huge sums
being lost to fraud and irregularity within Community which are being bore by taxpayers and traders of Europe). "This strikes at the roots of democratic societies, based as
they are on the rule of law and its enforcement, and is a public scandal." Id. See also
Council Resolution, supra note 2 (reporting on progress towards European Union);
Sherlock & Harding, supra note 2, at 20-36 (discussing suspected sources of fraud and
corruption within Community). See generally Report No. 1/1999, supra note 2, at 1 in
Chapter 2(c) (1) (discussing historical background of fraud in Community leading up
to Regulation 1073/1999); Special Report, supra note 2 (noting types of transactions
that may encourage fraud).
10, 11 (estimating huge
56. See Select Committee Report, supra note 2, at
amounts of money surrendered to fraudulent activity). See also Parliament Questions to
the Commission in cooperation to combat fraud in connection with the Community
budget, O.J. C 155/12 (1992) (asking what could be done about proliferation of fraud
estimated to be 10% of Community budget); Report No. 1/1999, supra note 2, at I 1 in
Chapter 2(c) (1) (discussing history of fraud and corruption in Community).
57. Commission Report, COM (1987) 572 Final (November 20, 1987) [hereinafter
Commission Report on Fraud] (outlining need for ramping up fight against fraud and
corruption within Community).
58. See Commission Report on Fraud, supra note 57, COM(1987) 572 Final (suggesting tougher measures to fight against fraud affecting Community budget). See also
Council Regulation No. 2185/96, O.J. L 292, at 2-5 (1996) [hereinafter Regulation
2185/96] (allowing on-the-spot-checks and inspections to detect fraud and other irregularities); Council Regulation No. 2988/95, O.J. L 312, at 1 (1995) [hereinafter Regulation 2988/95] (referring to participation of Office officials in Commission's on-thespot-checks concerning protection of Community's financial interests).
59. Parliament Resolution No. A4-0297/98, O.J. C 328/95 (1999) [hereinafter
BOESCH Report] (calling for more far-reaching, independent role of Unit for Coordination of Fight Against Fraud ("UCLAF")).
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Prior to the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam,6" fraud
prevention fell outside the Council of Ministers' enumerated
powers. 6 Regardless, the Council did pass fraud prevention legislation by virtue of Article 308 EC, the so-called elastic clause,
enabling it to act to achieve the objectives of the common market by unanimous vote.6 2 Through the 1990s, the Council extended UCLAF's investigative authority, including coverage of
on-the-spot-checks, 6 3 to fight against the growing cost of fraud
within the Community.6 4
The Commission, however, received a serious blow to its
reputation in December 1998 when an assistant auditor in the
Commission's financial control department, Paul van Buitenen,
presented the Parliament with a thirty-page dossier and a "carload of evidence" indicating widespread corruption within the
Commission.6 5 Buitenen's evidence indicated cases of fraud,
60. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 48, OJ. C 340/1 (amending TEU, EC
Treaty, ECSC Treaty, and Euratom Treaty and renumbering articles of TEU and EC
Treaty).
61. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, Part One, OJ. C 325/33, at 40
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 80 (setting prerogatives and principles to be followed by Community institutions).
62. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 308, O.J. C 325/33, at 153
(2002), 37 LL.M. at 140 (ex Article 235) (allowing Council to take action necessary to
achieve objectives of Community if not otherwise provided).
63. See Regulation 2185/96, supra note 58 (allowing on-the-spot-checks and inspections to detect fraud and other irregularities). See also Regulation 2988/95, supra note
58 (referring to participation of Office officials in Commission's on-the-spot-checks
concerning protection of Community's financial interests). See, e.g., Commission Regulation No. 1681/94, OJ. L 178/43 (1994) (concerning irregularities and recovery of
sums wrongly paid in connection with financing of structural policies and organizzation
of information system in this field).
64. See Select Committee Report, supra note 2, at 1 10, 11 (indicating cost of
fraud within Community as substantial portion of budget). See also Parliament Questions, supra note 56 (asking what could be done about proliferation of fraud estimated
to be 10% of Community budget); Report No. 1/1999, supra note 2, at I in Chapter
2(c)(1) (discussing history of fraud and corruption within Community).
65. See Committee of Independent Experts ("CIE"), First Report on Allegations
Regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission, at
9.4.25, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts/reportlen.html
(Mar. 15,
1999) [hereinafter First Report]. See also Bill Tupman, OLAF and the Wise Men: InvestigatingFraud within the European Commission as opposed to Fraud against the European Budget,
available at http://www.ex.ac.uk/politics/pol-data/papers/Olaf.html (Dec. 2, 2003)
(discussing fraud within Commission and steps to prevent further proliferation within
Community); Kelly Li, Recommendations for the Curbing of Corruption, Cronyism, Nepotism,
and Fraud in the European Commission, 24 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 161, 164 (2000)
(noting historical examples of fraud and measures taken to protect against fraud and
corruption in future).
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mismanagement, cronyism, and nepotism throughout the Commission.66
Specific allegations included Commissioner
Liikanen's employment of his wife,6 7 and Commissioner
Pinheiro's appointment of not only his wife but also his brotherin-law.68
The Parliament quickly assembled a Committee of Independent Experts ("CIE"), the five "Wise Men," consisting of three
auditors and two lawyers, to investigate specific allegations of
corruption.6 9 Afterjust three months, the inquiry uncovered evidence that culminated in a 144-page "catalog of negligence and
mismanagement. 7 0 Regarding the employment of Commissioner Liikanen's wife, the CIE found that she had a genuinely
independent life to her husband and that they both had behaved properly in terms of their relationship with the Commission. 7 ' Likewise, the CIE found the appointment of Mr.
Pinheiro's wife and brother-in-law to be imprudent but not irregular.72 The CIE added that while it had not encountered cases
66. See First Report, supra note 65, at 1 1.1.2 (listing specific cases that arose
through parliamentary discussions). See also id. at 11 9.2.1-9.2.3 (highlighting irregularities including allegations of favoritism, cronyism, and mismanagement by Commissioners Liikanen, Cresson, Marim, Pinheiro, Wulf-Mathies, and indicating that President
Santer failed to take action and entire Commission failed to combat fraud effectively (1
8.6.4).
67. See First Report, supra note 65, at 1 8.1.38 (discussing various cases of nepotism). See also Tupman, supra note 65 (noting CIE findings in regards to allegations).
68. See First Report, supra note 65, at 1 8.4.8 (discussing various cases of nepotism). See also Tupman, supra note 65 (noting CIE findings in regards to allegations).
69. See Parliament Resolution on Improving the Financial Management of the
Commission, 1999, O.J. C 104/106 (creating committee of independent experts). The
Committee appointed Andre Middelhoek as Chair. Id. Other members included IngaBritt Ahlenius, Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Pierre Lelong, and Walter van Gerven.
Id. See also Tupman, supra note 65 (noting CIE findings in regards to allegations); Li,
supra note 65, at 164 (recounting allegations brought by Paul van Buitenen).
70. Peter Conradi & Stephen Grey, Rudderless EU Faces Wholesale Shake Ups, SUNDAY
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, available at 1999 WL 14484566 (discussing allegations of fraud,
mismanagement, nepotism and cronyism within Commission and resulting mass resignation). See First Report, supra note 65 (outlining CIE's findings based on van
Buitenen's allegations). See also Li, supra note 65, at 165 (recounting allegations
brought by Paul van Buitenen); Tupman, supra note 65 (noting CIE findings in regards
to allegations).
71. See First Report, supra note 65, at 1 8.1.38 (discussing various cases of nepotism). See also Tupman, supra note 65 (noting CIE. findings in regards to allegations).
72. See First Report, supra note 65, at 11 9.2.1-9.2.3 (investigating irregularities,
especially allegations of favoritism, cronyism, and mismanagement by Commissioners
Liikanen, Cresson, Marim, Pinheiro, and Wulf-Mathies, with ultimate criticism of Commissioners Cresson and Wulf-Mathies as well as President Santer for failure to take action, and of entire Commission for failure to combat fraud effectively (1 8.6.4)). See
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where a Commissioner was directly and personally involved in
fraudulent activities, it did find instances where Commissioners
or the Commission had to accept responsibility for instances of
fraud, irregularity or mismanagement in their areas of special
responsibility. 73 Although the CIE found no proof that any
Commissioner had gained financially from any of these instances, the CIE refused to permit ignorance as a defense.7 ' The
report notably concluded that it was difficult to find anyone at
the Commission level who had the "slightest sense of responsibility" for combating these misdemeanors and fraud.7 5 Within
seven hours of the report's release on March 16, 1999, the entire
European Commission, under its President Jacques Santer (former Prime Minister of Luxembourg), took collective responsibility for the alleged inaction and announced its resignation en
76

masse.

When Romano Prodi (former Prime Minister of Italy) replaced Jacques Santer as President of the Commission in September 1999, he attempted to quell fears of continued fraud by
proclaiming "zero tolerance" for corruption in a "New Era of
Change."7 7 On April 28, 1999, under the auspice of its powers to
also Tupman, supra note 65 (discussing CIE findings in regard to allegations); Li, supra
note 65, at 166 (recounting allegations brought against Commission members).
73. See First Report, supra note 65, at
9.2.1-9.2.3 (commenting on overall findings of investigations into fraud, mismanagement, nepotism, and cronyism within Commission). See also Tupman, supra note 65 (noting CIE comments relating to its investigation); Li, supra note 65, at 166 (recounting CIE findings).
74. See First Report, supra note 65, at
9.2.1-9.2.3 (reporting conclustions of investigations and assessment of Commissioners' involvement). See also Tupman, supra
note 65 (noting CIE comments relating to its investigation); Li, supra note 65, at 166
(recounting CIE findings).
75. See First Report, supra note 65, at
9.2.1-9.2.3 (noting level of responsibility
of individual Commissioners and performance of entire Commission). See also
Tupman, supra note 65 (noting CIE comments relating to its investigation); Li, supra
note 65, at 166 (recounting CIE findings).
76. See Conradi & Grey, supra note 70 (reporting on Commission's mass resignation immediately following release of CIE's report). See also Statement by President
Jacques Santer day after resignation of members of Commission (Mar. 16 1999) available at http://www.lex.unict.it/cde/documenti/vari/98_99/statement-j-s-17-03.htm
(Feb. 11, 2004); House of Commons Research Paper 99/32, The Resignation of the European Commission, at 7 availableat http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp
99/rp99-032.pdf (Mar. 16, 1999) (discussing unprecedented resignation of entire Commission).
77. See Conradi & Grey, supra note 70 (reporting on Commission's mass resignation immediately following release of CIE's report). See also Commission Report, Protecting the Communities' Financial Interests and the Fight Against Fraud, COM (1999)
590 Final (Dec., 1999) [hereinafter OLAF Report] (recording measures taken by various
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set its own internal procedure,78 the Commission replaced
UCLAF with OLAF - an anti-fraud office that wields greater authority and has been granted a stronger statement of independence than its predecessor.7 9
B. Decision 1999/352 Establishing OLAF
On October 7, 1998, the Parliament had adopted a resolution urging a more independent status for the Unit for Coordination of UCLAF. ° By December of that year the Commission
had proposed legislation to create a completely independent
Fraud Investigative Office that would supplant UCLAF's realm of
responsibility.8 ' Internally, the Commission adopted Decision
1999/352 outlining the organization of OLAF, whose powers of
investigation would expand to all institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the Community by virtue of the Commission's December 1998 Proposal for a joint regulation of the Council and
2
Parliament.
The Commission's proposal for a Regulation envisaged Europe's Fraud Investigation Office in a form slightly different
than OLAF appears today. 83 The Commission initially proposed
that the Regulation would create the Fraud Investigative Office
Commission General Directorates and services to protect Community financial interests
and crack down on fraud); Commission White Paper on reformation of Community
Financial Controls, COM(2000) 200 Final/2, at 23 (discussing ways to avoid instances of
fraud and corruption in future).
78. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 218(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 122
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 124 (ex Article 162) (giving Commission authority to adopt its
Rules of Procedure in accordance with provisions of EC Treaty).
79. See Decision 1999/352, supra note 3. See also OLAF Report, supra note 77 (reporting on OLAF's first-year operations); OLAF Press Release, First Report of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) on Operational Activities available at http://europa.eu.
int/comm/antifraud/pressroom/pr/2000/04_2000_en.html (June 6, 2000) (representing intention to replace UCLAF with OLAF, more independent and far-reaching
body).
80. See BOESCH Report, supra note 59 (recommending UCLAF be afforded more
independence and further reach in carrying out fraud prevention measures).
81. See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing European
Fraud Investigation Office, COM (98) 717 Final (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Initial Proposal] (proposing creation of completely autonomous body to fight fraud within Community bodies and institutions). See also Decision 1999/352, supra note 3 (deciding to
create body under Commission to oversee fraud prevention throughout Community
bodies and institutions).
82. See Initial Proposal, supra note 81 (proposing creation of completely autonomous body to fight fraud within Community bodies and institutions).
83. Compare Initial Proposal, supra note 81 (proposing OLAF as separate entity

1526

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1509

with total autonomy, its own legal personality and no subordination to the Commission whatsoever. s4 The Commission contended that OLAF must have absolute independence in order to
ensure that its investigative operations would not be tainted politically.15 The view that OLAF should exist outside of the Commission did not gain much support however, and in March 1999
the Commission modified its legislative proposal to keep OLAF
as a Commission office but with the proviso of guaranteed independence in carrying out its investigative duties.8 6
Thus, by April 1999 the Commission had created OLAF
under Article 218 EC 87 as an internal body to succeed to the
functions performed previously by UCLAF.8 8 The Commission
retained the power to appoint the Director for a term of fiveyears, which could be renewed only once.8 9 When hiring the
employees of OLAF, the Director would be required to conform
to both the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the Commission Decisions on its own internal organization.9" To make sure that OLAF did not fall too squarely
under the shadow of the Commission, Article 3 of Decision
1999/352 specifically states that OLAF shall exercise its investigative powers "in complete independence," that the Director may
not seek or take instructions from the Commission or any other
with complete independence), with Decision 1999/352, supra note 3 (creating OLAF as
entity operating under Commission).
84. See Initial Proposal, supra note 81, art. 8 (proposing OLAF as completely autonomous body).
85. Initial Proposal, supra note 81, at
3-4 (giving reasons for OLAF's complete
independence).
86. Commission, Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation Concerning Investigations Conducted by the Fraud Prevention Office, COM (1999) 140 Final, at 2 (Mar.
17, 1999) [hereinafter Amended Proposal] (changing position of complete OLAF independence to OLAF as entity operating under Commission).
87. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 218, O.J. C 325/33, at 122
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 124 (ex Article 162) (allowing Commission to adopt its internal
Rules of Procedure to ensure its departments operate in accordance with EC Treaty).
88. See Decision 1999/352, supra note 3, at 1 3 (deciding to create body under
Commission to oversee fraud prevention throughout Community bodies and institutions). See also Commission Report on Fraud, supra note 57 (suggesting tougher measures to fight against fraud affecting Community budget); OLAF Report, supra note 77
(recording measures taken by various Commission General Directorates and services to
protect Community financial interests and crack down on fraud).
89. See Decision 1999/352, supra note 3, art. 5 (enumerating appointment and
term limits of OLAF Director).
90. See Decision 1999/352, supra note 3, art. 6 (outlining authority and limitations
of OLAF Director when hiring employees).
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Community institution or body."
In addition to complete independence, the Commission's
December 1998 proposal had included a Board of Management
to oversee and offer opinions to the Director, adopt rules of procedure and draft an annual report.9 2 Since OLAF did not become an independent body, however, it could not have a Board
of Management.9 3 Accordingly, the Commission created, first
in its second proposal and finally in Decision 1999/352, an independent Surveillance Committee, consisting of experts in the
field, to assist and monitor the discharge of OLAF's investigative
functions.9 4
As a final point, Article 7 of Decision 1999/352 states that
the decision establishing OLAF will take effect only after the entry of a European Parliament and Council Regulation concerning the investigative functions of OLAF. 5 Although case law has
allowed the Commission's internal measures to have legal effects
on third parties,9 6 the Commission's authority under Article 218
EC on its procedural rules only extends to its internal operations. 97 In other words, the Commission did not have the capacity to create an internal body to conduct investigations through91. See Decision 1999/352, supra note 3, art. 3 (modeling EC Treaty provision language for independence of Commission itself). See e.g., Consolidated EC Treaty, supra
note 4, art. 213(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 120 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 123 (ex Article 157)
(requiring Commission to neither seek nor take instruction from any other government
or body).
92. See Initial Proposal, supra note 81, art. 9 (creating OLAF Board of Management).
93. See Amended Proposal, supra note 86, at
9 (commenting on changes required under Commission's new amended proposal keeping OLAF as Commission
body).
94. See Amended Proposal, supra note 86, at 9 (establishing Surveillance Committee to act in lieu of initially proposed Board of Management). See also Decision
1999/352, supra note 3, art. 4 (outlining structure and function of OLAF Surveillance
Committee).
95. See Amended Proposal, supra note 86, art. 7 (stating that entry into force would
occur after Parliament and Council adopted regulation concerning OLAF's investigative authority). See aLso Decision 1999/352, supra note 3, art. 7 (stating that entry into
force would occur after Parliament and Council adopted regulation concerning
OLAF's investigative authority).
96. See Nakajima v. Council, Case C-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2069,
49-50 (holding that purpose Community institution's rules of procedure is to organize internal
operations for good administration while respecting prerogatives of other institutions).
See also Dutzler, supra note 31 (discussing case law regarding internal decisions having
effect on other Community institutions and bodies).
97. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 218, OJ. C 325/33, at 122
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 124 (ex Article 162) (providing that Commission shall adopt its
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out the wide sphere of the Community, and therefore needed a
legal basis for granting OLAF such authority. 98 Without such authority, OLAF could not exercise oversight over other Community bodies and institutions, or Member State bodies acting as
agents of EC programs.9 9 Thus, the Commission submitted its
proposal to the Council and Parliament for a wider-reaching regulation.10 0
C. Regulation 1073/1999 Concerning OLAF Investigations

The Commission acting alone could not expand OLAF's investigative authority to the desired level.' 0 ' Additionally, at the
time the Commission first proposed an independent central
body to head all fraud investigative functions, 10 2 the EC Treaty
provided no specific legal basis on which to adopt such legislation."' As a result, the initial proposal was introduced on the
internal Rules of Procedure while ensuring that its departments operate in accordance
with EC Treaty).
98. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 218, O.J. C 325/33, at 122
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 124 (ex Article 162) (allowing Commission to adopt its internal
Rules of Procedure to ensure its departments operate in accordance with EC Treaty).
See also Nakajima, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2069, 1 49-50 (holding that purpose of Community
institution's rules of procedure is to organize internal operations for good administration while respecting prerogatives of other institutions); Dutzler, supra note 31, at 2
(discussing Commission's inability to adopt legislation directly effecting other Community institutions and bodies).
99. See Dutzler, supra note 31, at 2 (discussing limitations of Commission authority
to create Commission agency to conduct fraud investigations in all Community institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies). See also Nakajima, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2069,
49-50
(holding that purpose of Community institution's rules of procedure is to organize
internal operations for good administration while respecting prerogatives of other institutions).
100. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 280(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 146
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 136 (ex Article 209a) (allowing Council and Parliament to jointly
pass fraud prevention measures within Community). See also Initial Proposal, supra
note 81 (proposing creation of office to fight fraud within Community bodies and institutions); Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3 (granting OLAF authority to conduct investigations throughout Community institutions, bodies, agencies, and offices).
101. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 218, O.J. C 325/33, at 122
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 124 (ex Article 162) (granting Commission authority to adopt its
internal Rules of Procedure in accordance with EC Treaty).
102. See Initial Proposal, supra note 81 (proposing creation of office to fight fraud
within Community bodies and institutions).
103. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 308, O.J. C 325/33, at 153
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 140 (ex Article 235) (allowing Council to take action, if taken
unanimously on proposal from Commission and after consulting Parliament, in order
to attain Community's objectives if necessary powers are not otherwise provided by EC
Treaty).
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basis of Article 308 EC, which gives the Council power to take
appropriate action by unanimous vote, where no express power
exists and such action is necessary to attain the objectives of the
Community.1 4 Fortunately, the Treaty of Amsterdam added
paragraph four to Article 280 EC 10 5 on May 1, 1999, just prior to
the final Commission proposal. °6 Once ratified, the Council
and the Parliament were able to adopt necessary measures to
prevent and fight fraud affecting the financial interests of the
Community, through the codecision procedure. 10 7 The Commission's proposal, now having a specific legal basis, still faced
the principle of each institution's organizational autonomy.'
Short of amending the Staff Regulations of every institution
and body inside the Community, the operational independence
of OLAF depended on the adoption of internal decisions among
these institutions and bodies.1 0 9 In light of this, the Commission's initial December 1998 proposal provided that every institution or body could adopt a decision to allow OLAF to carry out
104. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 308, O.J. C 325/33, at 153
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 140 (ex Article 235) (requiring Council to act unanimously on
proposal from Commission, only after consulting Parliament).
105. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 280(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 146
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 136 (ex Article 209a) (allowing Council and Parliament to jointly
pass fraud prevention measures within Community).
106. See Amended Proposal, supra note 86 (incorporating changes and suggestions
made to first proposal by Parliament, Council and Court of Auditors). See also Treaty of
Amsterdam, supra note 48, O.J. C 340/1 (1997).
107. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 280(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 146
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 136 (ex Article 209a) (referring to codecision procedure prescribed in Article 251 EC). In Codecision procedure, Commission submits legislative
proposal to Parliament and Council for approval; Parliament proposes amendments or
approves act; Council then approves Parliament's amendments (if any) or communicates reasons for otherwise adopting common position on proposed act; finally Parliament may adopt or again add amendments to common position. Consolidated EC
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 251, O.J. C 325/33, at 133 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 129 (ex Article
189b) (enumerating codecision procedure).
108. See Tupman, supra note 65 (pointing out that Commission's proposal implied
lengthy process of amendments to staff regulations and conditions of employment of
officials and other servants of Community bodies). See, e.g., ESCB/ECB Statute, supra
note 5, art 12.3 (allowing ECB Governing Council to adopt Rules of Procedure determining ECB internal organization); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 218(2),
O.J. C 325/33, at 122 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 124 (ex Article 162) (allowing Commission to
adopt Rules of Procedure in accordance with EC Treaty).
109. See Court of Auditors Opinion No. 2/99, O.J. C 154/1, at
6 (1999) (commenting on amended proposal for Council Regulation concerning investigation conducted by OLAF).
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internal investigations within it."' The Commission's amended
March 1999 proposal, however, made such rulemaking
mandatory. 1" The Court of Auditors first voiced its concern
that the amended proposal failed to clarify the precise content
of each institution's required decisions.1 1 2 Thus, in its final
draft, Regulation 1073/1999 not only required each institution
and body to adopt internal decisions, but also outlined certain
provisions that the decisions must contain for OLAF to be effective."11
For instance, while Regulation 1073/1999 made clear that
OLAF must conform to the rules of the Treaties, in particular
the Protocol on privileges and immunities of the institutions of
the Community," 4 it granted OLAF considerable access to information and to the premises of any institution, body, office or
agency being investigated.' 1 5 Although OLAF must generally inform the institution when is seeks such access1 16 and keep all
information obtained confidential, 1 7 the institution or body
subject to the investigation must provide OLAF, "without delay,"
110. See Initial Proposal, supra note 81, at art. 3(2) (addressing issue of internal
investigations conducted by OLAF).
111. SeeAmended Proposal, supra note 86, at art. 4(1) (requiring each Community
institution, body, agency and office to adopt internal decisions providing necessary authority and special considerations during OLAF investigations). See also Regulation
1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (making it mandatory for each Community institution, body, agency and office to adopt decisions allowing OLAF to conduct investigations within it).
112. See Court of Auditors Opinion No. 2/99, supra note 109, at 7 (voicing concern that proposal failed to specify necessary amendments of each institution's required
decision allowing OLAF investigations).
113. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 4 (outlining provisions each institution and body's internal decision must contain in allowing OLAF to conduct investigations).
114. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (stating requirements of
OLAF's conduct during all investigations regardless of each institution and body's internal decision).
115. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 4(2) (giving OLAF right of "immediate and unannounced access to any information").
116. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 4(4) and (5) (requiring OLAF to
inform institution or body of investigation prior to commencement of such investigation).
117. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 8 (ensuring all information obtained during OLAF investigations is kept confidential). See also Consolidated EC
Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 286-87, O.J. C 325/33, at 147 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 136 (ex
Articles 213b and 214) (protecting personal data and creating obligation of professional secrecy).
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any document relating to the investigation.1 1 In its internal decision, each institution and body needs to make clear the duty of
its members, managers, officials and other servants to cooperate
and supply information to OLAF, while also specifying the observances OLAF's employees should take when conducting internal investigations." 9
Testament to OLAF's independence from the Commission,
only the Director of OLAF may initiate an internal investigation,
acting on his own volition or upon a request from the body subject to the investigation. 2 0 The Director orchestrates the investigations, and is required to equip employees with written authorization showing their identity, their capacity, and the subject matter of the inquiry.' 2 1 Upon its conclusion, the Director of OLAF
must provide a report indicating the facts established, any financial loss, and the findings of the investigation to the institution,
body, office or agency that was subjected to the inquiry for corrective action. 1 2 2 To ensure that OLAF does not abuse its considerable independence, a Supervisory Committee oversees its
operations 123 and a procedure for filing complaints
about ad24
verse affects of investigations was provided.
To get the ball rolling on the adoption of the internal decisions granting OLAF investigative authority, the Parliament, the
Council, and the Commission rapidly agreed on May 25, 1999, in
an interinstitutional agreement, 1 25 to adopt a model decision for
118. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 7 (requiring employees and officers of Community institutions and bodies to provide pertinent information to OLAF
during investigations).
119. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 4(6) (requiring each institutions
internal decisions to specify duties of employees to provide OLAF information and remain helpful during investigations).
120. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 5 (detailing circumstances in
which investigation may be commenced by OLAF).
121. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 6 (stating OLAF Director's duties
of transparency when conducting investigations).
122. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 9 (requiring report documenting
findings and conduct of investigation to be generated at its conclusion).
123. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, arts. 11, 12 (outlining tasks of Supervisory Committee and oversight of tasks of Director).
124. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, arts. 14 (providing for complaint process relating to adverse affects of investigations).
125. See Commission Report, Evaluation of the activities of the European Antifraud Office (OLAF), COM (2003) 154 Final (Feb. 4, 2003) (discussing nature of Interinstitutional Agreement). Interinstitutional Agreement is political agreement between
institutions on equal footing in relation to one another. Id. Such agreements are not
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the operation of investigations conducted by OLAF within their
institutions. 1 26 Under this interinstitutional agreement, each institution agreed not to deviate from the model agreement unless
their particular requirements called for such a deviation as a
technical necessity. 1 27 Taking note of this interinstitutional
agreement, the ECJ, despite its complete independence from
the political institutions, separately agreed to grant OLAF full
access to all its documents and information except those related
1 28
to a lawsuit.
Unlike the participants of the interinstitutional agreement
or the ECJ, the ECB's Governing Council believed the ECB to be
outside the reach of OLAF but saw the need for fraud prevention measures and thus adopted Decision No. 1999/726129 by virtue of its powers of internal organization in October 1999.130
The EIB Board of Governors adopted a similar anti-fraud mea"law" but rather create so-called "soft law" and expresses reciprocal duties of sincere
cooperation and mutual trust between institutions concerned. Id. Here, it expresses
wish for instrument to monitor reform and to support and regulate it pending appropriate provisions in Staff Regulations. Id. Politically, it officializes commitment of Commission, Council and Parliament and sets objective of extending it to other institutions
and bodies, via political-level invitation. Id. Methodologically, it provides model for
smooth operation of interinstitutional cooperation and coordination and makes for
better legibility and transparency. Id.
126. See Interinstitutional Agreement, supra note 3, at 15 (concerning adoption of
internal decisions allowing investigations by OLAF).
127. See Interinstitutional Agreement, supra note 3, at 15 (addressing implementation of internal decisions permitting investigations by OLAF). See generally Willi Rothley
and Others v. Parliament, Case T-17/00, [2000] E.C.R. II 2085 (ruling on Amendment
to Rules of Procedure of Parliament and holding that neither Protocol on Privileges
and Immunities nor Parliament's amended Rules of Procedure protected Parliament
Members' rights of privacy regarding OLAF investigations); EP amendment, supra note
3 (adding Article 9a to Parliament's Rules of Procedure concerning Internal investigations conducted by OLAF).
128. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Commission v. European Central
Bank, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. _, at
167 (summarizing Decision de la Cour de
Justice du 26 octobre 1999 relative aux conditionset modalites des enquetes internes en matiere de
lutte contre la fraude, la corruption et toute activite illegale prejudiciable aux interets des Cornmunautes [Decision of ECJ on October 26, 1999 relating to conditions and procedures
of OLAF in investigating corruption and illegal activities detrimental to financial interests of Community]). This Decision is available only in French and has not been published in the Official Journal. Id. See also Dutzler, supra note 31, at 3 (discussing ECJ
internal decision allowing OLAF investigations).
129. See ECB Decision, supra note 44 (establishing internal Anti-Fraud Committee
to oversee D-IA in combating fraud within ECB).
130. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 12.3 (stating that ECB Governing
Council adopts Rules of Procedure which determine ECB's internal organization).
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D. The Contested Decisions
The Council and Parliament adopted Regulation 1073/
1999 in May 1999, and in October of the same year the ECB
reacted by creating its own Anti-Fraud Committee within its D-IA
responsible for carrying out fraud investigations.13 2 The composition of the ECB's Anti-Fraud Committee is modeled on that of
OLAF's Surveillance Committee consisting of three (five in the
OLAF Surveillance Committee) independent persons with outstanding qualifications in the area of fraud prevention,1 3 1 for a
once renewable three-year term."3 4 Not surprisingly, the AntiFraud Committee and the entire D-IA have a sphere of responsibility with a remarkable resemblance to the authority reserved
for OLAF.' 3 5 For example, the rules applying to D-IA investigations mirror the responsibilities of OLAF: D-IA is required to
inform the person who is the subject of its investigation, 136 conduct all their activities under the rules of the Treaties, 3 ' and
observe the rules of professional secrecy with all information obtained. 3 Further, while the ECB Decision enumerated a duty
of ECB staff to inform the Anti-Fraud Committee of fraud or
131. See EIB Decision, supra note 45 (communicating anti-fraud procedure to combat fraud within EIB and limiting OLAF's authority in this regard).
132. See ECB Decision, supra note 44 (creating Committee to reinforce independence of D-IA in combating fraud within ECB).
133. Compare ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 1(3) (outlining qualifications of
Anti-Fraud Committee members) with Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 11 (2)
(outlining qualifications of OLAF Surveillance Committee members).
134. Compare ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 1(4) (setting term-limits for AntiFraud Committee members to be non-renewable 3-year term) with Regulation 1073/
1999, supra note 3, art. 11 (3), (4) (setting term-limits for OLAF Surveillance Committee
members to be non-renewable 3-year term).
135. Compare ECB Decision, supra note 44 (establishing D-IA to combat fraud
within ECB and enumerating its sphere of responsibility) with Regulation 1073/1999,
supra note 3 (establishing OLAF to combat fraud within all Community institutions and
bodies and enumerating its sphere of responsibility).
136. Compare ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 4 (discussing D-IA's duty to inform
subject of investigation) with Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 4(4) (discussing
OLAF's duty to inform subject of investigation).
137. Compare ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 5(1) (requiring D-IA to conduct its
investigations in conformity with requirements of EC Treaty) with Regulation 1073/
1999, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (requiring OLAF to conduct its investigations in conformity with requirements of EC Treaty).
138. Compare ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 7 (requiring D-IA to observe rules
of confidentiality when performing investigations) with Regulation 1073/1999, supra
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illegal activities, no duty existed to inform OLAF.1 3 9 In fact, the
only mention of any interaction with OLAF refers to the ECB
Anti-Fraud Committee's responsibility of the relationship with
140
OLAF's Supervisory Committee.
Furthermore, the ECB Anti-Fraud Committee is clearly
stated to be independent from ECB influence and responsible
for monitoring the discharge of D-IA's activities."' Like the Supervisory Committee overseeing OLAF, the Anti-Fraud Committee may, where appropriate, instruct the D-IA in the performance of its activities.1 4 2 The D-IA is required to report to the
43
Anti-Fraud Committee on its investigations and actions taken,
and the Anti-Fraud Committee is, in turn, to report D-IA activi1 44
ties to the ECB Governing Council and its external auditors
and may inform the national judicial authority where there may
145
have been a violation of a national criminal law.
146
The EIB passed a decision similar to that of the ECB.
The EIB's decision, however, did not create an internal OLAFlike entity, but rather limited OLAF's investigative authority to
cover only the portion of the EIB's budget relating to Community finances. 147 If OLAF suspected fraud relating to funds
outside of that portion of the EIB budget, it may report it to the
EIB President where the matter would be forwarded to the EIB
note 3, art. 8 (requiring OLAF to observe rules of confidentiality when performing
investigations).
139. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 5 (requiring ECB employees and officers
to report and cooperate fully with D-IA during investigations).
140. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 1(9) (charging only ECB Anti-Fraud
Committee with duty of interacting with OLAF).
141. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 1(1)-(5) (stating that Anti-Fraud Committee consists of three outside independent persons for renelvable three-year term,
who may neither seek nor take instructions from other Community institutions or bodies).
142. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 1(7) (providing authority in ECB AntiFraud Committee to monitor D-IA activities).
143. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 3 (requiring D-IA to report to ECB AntiFraud Committee on investigations and actions taken).
144. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 1(8) (requiring ECB Anti-Fraud Committee to report D-IA activities to ECB Executive Board and independent auditors).
145. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 1(10) (allowing ECB Anti-Fraud Committee to report possible violations of law to appropriate judiciary).
146. See EIB Decision, supra note 45 (communicating anti-fraud procedure to combat fraud within EIB and limiting OLAF's authority in this regard).
147. See Commission v. European Investment Bank, Case C-15/00, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at 1 45-46 (citing EIB Decision at 1 4-5 of Part I).
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Audit Committee for further investigating and reporting. 4 '
While the EIB enjoys a different legal status and less technical
nonetheless
independence than the ECB, the Commission
14 9
bodies.
both
of
decisions
the
annul
to
sought
II. MUDDLING THROUGH PROGRESS: FRAUD PREVENTION
V EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
The Commission considered both the ECB's anti-fraud decision and the EIB's anti-fraud decision to be in violation of the
provisions of Regulation 1073/1999 and consequently sued both
bodies in a proceeding before the ECJ. 15 ° The Commission, supported by the Council, the Parliament, and the Netherlands Government, requested the ECJ to annul the ECB and EIB's Contested Decisions as infringing upon Regulation 1073/1999.11
In response, the ECB and EIB denied that their Contested
Decisions infringed Regulation 1073/1999, claiming that all of
the acts pursued the same objectives, and in the alternative, the
Banks claimed that Regulation 1073/1999 should be interpreted
as inapplicable to them. 5 2 Resolution of this dispute, then, be148. See European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 11 45-46 (citing EIB Decision at I 4-5 of Part I).
149. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33, at 126
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 125 (ex Article 173) (allowing Commission to challenge action of
ECB). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 237, OJ. C 325/33, at 128
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 126 (ex Article 180) (allowing Commission to challenge action of
Board of Governors of EIB); Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-11/00,
[2003] E.C.R. _ (challenging ECB's anti fraud decision for infringement of Regulation
1073/1999); European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. __ (challenging EIB's anti fraud
decision for infringement of Regulation 1073/1999).
150. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _ (challenging ECB's anti fraud decision for infringement of Regulation 1073/1999). See also European Investment Bank,
[2003] E.C.R. _ (challenging EIB's anti fraud decision for infringement of Regulation
1073/1999); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 230, 241, OJ. C 325/33, at 126,
190 (91(19N

Rl'7 I T M at 19r, 197 f-

Artirl

17A pind 1R41 (rivino,

F.1 iuirig~dcrinn in

cases concerning regulations adopted jointly by Council and Parliament or ECB relating to its application or misuse of powers); id. art. 237, OJ. C 325/33, at 128 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 126 (ex Article 180) (giving ECJ jurisdiction over measures adopted by Board
of Governors of EIB).
151. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at
52 (challenging ECB antifraud measures on grounds of infringement of Regulation 1073/1999). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 53 (challenging EIB antifraud measures on
grounds of infringement of Regulation 1073/1999).
152. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 77 56-57 (presenting ECB's
contentions in defense of its anti-fraud measures). See also European Investment Bank,
[2003] E.C.R. -, at
58 (presenting EIB's contentions in defense of its anti-fraud
measures).
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came a two-part analysis. First, was Regulation 1073/1999 applicable to the ECB and the EIB, and if so, could the Contested
Decisions and Regulation 1073/1999 coexist. 53 Advocate GeneralJacobs's opinion in both cases held against the ECB and EIB
on both issues. 154 The ECJ'sjudgment, likewise largely followed
1 55
Jacobs's view as to both.
This Note will first discuss the questions of applicability and
legality of Regulation 1073/1999 regarding the Banks, focusing,
first, on the scope of the Council and Parliament's authority to
1 56
adopt fraud prevention measures affecting the ECB and EIB.
Second, it will analyze the admissibility of the ECB's objection of
illegality, 15 7 the duty to consult the ECB when passing such legislation, 15 81 the extent of the Banks' independence1 59 and the requirements of the principle of proportionality when passing
such legislation.16 ° Finally this Note will look at the ECJ's findings regarding the infringement of Regulation 1073/1999 and
153. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 58 (breaking analysis of issue
down for discussion). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
46 (identifying particular
issues of case).
154. As is well known, ECJ's Advocate Generals provide influential advisory opinions prior to start of ECJ's own deliberations. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,
European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1195 (holding ECB's anti-fraud measures in
violation of Regulation 1073/1999). See also Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. __, at
167 (holding EIB's anti-fraud measures in
violation of Regulation 1073/1999);
155. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 186 (deciding ECB's anti-fraud
measures where incompatible with Regulation 1073/1999). See also European Investment
Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 187 (sustaining EIB's anti-fraud measures violated Regulation 1073/1999).
156. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 280(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 146
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 136 (ex Article 209a) (allowing Council and Parliament to adopt
fraud prevention measures that affect Community's financial interests).
157. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 241, O.J. C 325/33, at 129
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 127 (ex Article 184) (ensuring right of any party to bring action
under Article 230 EC on grounds of infringement of essential procedural requirement
if instituted within two months).
158. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 75
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (requiring ECB to be consulted on any proposed Community act falling within its "field of competence").
159. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (barring members of ECB decision-making
bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies). See
also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 7 (repeating Article 108 EC); Commission v.
Council of Governors of the EIB, Case C-85/86, [1988] E.C.R. 1281 (ruling on legal
status of EIB and rejecting idea that EIB was third party to Community).
160. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5, O.J. C 325/33, at 41-42
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whether the Banks' anti-fraud decisions could coexist with Regulation 1073/1999.161
A. Applicability and Legality of Regulation 1073/1999
Several questions concerning the applicability and the legality of Regulation 1073/1999 arose out of the Commission's cases
against the two Banks. 6 2 First, because the Council only had
authority to pass measures combating fraud that affected the "financial interests of the Community,"1 6 3 and because both the
164
ECB and EIB arguably have their own budget and resources,
could the Council pass anti-fraud measures affecting the ECB or
EIB?16 5 If found so applicable, what were the essential procedural requirements for adopting such legislation? 16 6 Would the
Regulation undermine the ECB's or EIB's independence as provided by the EC Treaty? 6 7 Would it violate the principle of pro(2002), 37 LL.M. at 80 (ex Article 3b) (stating that action by Community must not go
beyond what is "necessary" to achieve objectives of Community).
161. See ECB Decision, supra note 44 (creating D-IA to combat fraud within ECB).
See also EIB Decision supra note 45 (communicating anti-fraud procedure to combat
fraud within EIB and limiting OLAF's authority in this regard); Regulation 1073/1999
supra note 3 (conferring OLAF with authority to investigate allegations and suspicions
of fraud in all Community institutions and bodies).
162. See Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. _, at
57 (raising issues of illegality and inapplicability of Regulation 1073/1999 in regards
to ECB). See also Commission v. European Investment Bank, Case C-15/00, [2003]
E.C.R. -, at 7 53-55, 86, 87 (arguing illegality and inapplicability of Regulation 1073/
1999 in regards to EIB).
163. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 280(4), OJ. C 325/33, at 146
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 136 (ex Article 209a) (allowing Council and Parliament to jointly
pass fraud prevention measures within Community).
164. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 28-30 (naming ECB's resources as
shareholder contributions from NCBs and from income generated through ECB and
NCB business). See also EIB Statute, supra note 38, at art. 4(1) (providing that EIB's
capital shall be derived from subscription of Member States).
165. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -_,
at 80 (arguing for strict reading
of EC provision allowing Council to adopt measures to protect Community financial
interests against fraud). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 87
(contending that EC Treaty provision allowing Council to adopt measures to protect
Community financial interests against fraud does not include bodies with independent
budgets); Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -,
at
102 (acknowledging that ECB does in fact have budget independent of Community).
166. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 69 (pointing out procedural
requirements of passing legislation effecting ECB).
167. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 769 (submitting that EC Treaty
requires ECB to remain independent of political considerations). See also European In-
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portionality?1

1. The Applicability of Regulation 1073/1999
Because Regulation 1073/1999 was adopted on the basis of
Article 280 EC,16 9 the ECB and EIB argued that the Council and
Parliament intended the scope of the regulation to exclude bodies whose financial interests and budget were distinct from that
of the Community.1 7 0 The Banks both contended that the
phrase "financial interests of the Community" in Article 280 EC
must mean only expenditures and revenues coming from the EC
budget, because that portion of the EC Treaty deals solely with
various aspects of the Community budget and contains no reference to the ECB or the EIB.17 1 In support of their interpretation, the Banks pointed to Council Regulation 2988/95,172
which acknowledges the link between the Community budget
"t
and the expression "financial interests of the Community. 7
vestment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at I 87 (submitting that EC Treaty and established case
law provides high level of autonomy for EIB).
168. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 69 (arguing that OLAF investigation would be ineffectual within ECB because of high degree of secrecy required).
See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at I 87 (submitting that OLAF investigations would be superfluous within EIB because of EC Treaty provisions limiting its
authority over EIB and because of measures already in place to combat fraud).
169. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 280(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 146
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 136 (ex Article 209a) (allowing Council and Parliament to jointly
pass fraud prevention measures within Community).
170. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 60 (arguing for strict reading
of EC Treaty provision allowing Council to adopt measures to protect Community financial interests against fraud). See also EuropeanInvestment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at I
111 (contending that EC Treaty provision allowing Council to adopt measures to protect Community financial interests against fraud does not include bodies with independent budgets); Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, at art. 1(3) (stating that OLAF shall
conduct investigations within institutions, bodies, offices and agencies established by or
on basis of EC Treaty).
171. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 11 80, 82 (noting that Article
280 EC is located in Title II of Part Five of Consolidated EC Treaty, entitled Financial
Provisions). See also EuropeanInvestment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 11 112-13 (arguing
that EC Treaty provision allowing Council to adopt measures to protect Community
financial interests against fraud does not allow Council to adopt measures protecting
bodies with budgets independent of Community budget).
172. See Regulation 2988/95, supra note 58, art. 1(2) (defining irregularity as infringement of provision of Community law that affects or prejudices general budget of
Communities or budgets managed by them).
173. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 88 (contending that Community financial interests do not include budgets not relating to Community budget). See
also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. __, at 117 (pointing out that Community
financial interests are synonymous with Community budget).
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There, "irregularity" is narrowly defined as an illegal act or omis174
sion that results in loss of revenue to the Community budget.
The ECB, therefore emphasized that its resources come
from shareholder contributions and its own monetary operations, thus making it independent of the Community's budget
and resources. 175 The only link between the Community budget
and the ECB is the incidental Community tax on staff salaries
representing less than 3% of the ECB's own budget. 176 In addition, the ECB sought to bolster its argument with the fact that
the adoption of its budget and annual accounts fall exclusively
within the prerogative of its managing bodies, 177 which the EC
Treaty protects from possible
influence from the political institu78
tions of the Community.
The EIB likewise pointed to the fact that only 10% of its
business bears any ties with Community revenues.1 79 Moreover,
Article 248(1) and (3) EC restrict the functions of the Court of
Auditors to the revenues of the Community and bodies which
manage such revenue.18 0 Those provisions, the EIB argued, limits the Community's control over revenues or expenditures to
those relating to the Community budget.'
174. See Regulation 2988/95, supra note 58, art. 1(2) (defining irregularity as infringement of provision of Community law that affects or prejudices general budget of
Communities or budgets managed by them).
175. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
84-86 (noting that ECB
financial resources come primarily through its own business). See also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, arts. 28-30 (naming ECB's resources as shareholder contributions
from NCBs and from income generated through ECB and NCB business); Wise, supra
note 12, at 415 (discussing derivation of ECB income).
176. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 87 (acknowledging negligible, incidental link between Community budget and ECB expenditure).
177. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 86 (noting that management
of ECB budget falls with ECB decision-making bodies, which are to be free from political influence from outside bodies). See also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 26.2
(ntntincr
with whom control over ECB budget lies).
178. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (barring ECB from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions, and barring Community institutions from seeking
to influence ECB decision-makers). See also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 7
(repeating Article 108 EC).
179. See Commission v. European Investment Bank, Case C-15/00, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at
115 (noting EIB's negligible link with Community budget).
180. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 248(1),(3), O.J. C 325/33, at
131-32 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 128 (ex Article 188c) (limiting Court of Auditors control to
Community revenues and expenditures, and providing for on-the-spot audits only in
cases involving any body that manages such revenue or expenditure).
181. See European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 116 (conceding that negli-
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Advocate GeneralJacobs disagreed with the Banks' interpretation and stated that the language in Regulation 1073/1999 is
"entirely clear." 182 He pointed out that the 7th recital in the
regulation's preamble plainly declares that OLAF shall conduct internal investigations in all the institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies established by the EC Treaty.18 Jacobs concluded that
although neither the ECB nor the EIB are specifically listed as
institutions of the Community in Article 7 EC, they are established by Article 8 EC and 9 EC respectively and therefore fall
within the natural interpretation of the language in Regulation
1073/ 1999.184
Following the Advocate General, the ECJ rejected the
Banks' argument by shifting the focus from "the financial interests of the Community" to simply "the Community," pointing out
185
that both Banks are indeed part of the greater Community.
Any body owing its existence to the EC Treaty lives within the
Community framework, it reasoned, and thus its resources ex-

hibit a financial interest of the Community."8 6 The ECB, in pargible amount of EIB budget relates to Community budget, but rest of EIB budget is
outside of OLAF's reach).
182. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at
49 (responding to ECB's contention that it remains outside of Regulation
1073/1999's scope). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Investment
Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 90 (refuting EIB's contention that it remains outside of
Regulation 1073/1999's scope).
183. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European CentralBank,[2003] E.C.R. -'
at
50 (citing language found in Regulation 1073/1999 that indicates ECB was intended to fall under OLAF's authority). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,
European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 90 (noting that Regulation 1073/1999
intended to include EIB under OLAF's investigative authority); Regulation 1073/1999,
supra note 3, recital 7 (allowing OLAF power to conduct investigations within "all institutions, bodies, offices and agencies" of Community (emphasis added)); Regulation
1073/1999, supra note 3, arts. 1(3), 4(1), (6), 5, 6(6), 7(1)-(3), 9(4), 10(3), 14 (referring to regulations that apply to institutions, bodies, offices and agencies established by,
or on basis of EC Treaty).
184. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R.
-'
at
51 (referring to language in Regulation 1073/1999 that indicates ECB was
intended to fall under OLAF's investigative authority). See also Opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
90 (citing his own
opinion in European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _).
185. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
64, 90-91 (stating relationship ECB has with Community and its financial interests). See also European Investment
Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
97, 99, 119 (determining EIB's place within Community
framework and its relationship with Community financial interests).
186. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 91 (deciding that ECB falls
within scope of Regulation 1073/1999). See alsoEuropean Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R.
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ticular, as the central body in charge of setting monetary policy,
represents a fundamental player in furthering the Community's
financial objectives.'" 7 The ECJ interpreted the phrase "financial interests of the Community" broadly to express the financial
interests of all participants in the Community, thus including the
resources and expenditures of the ECB and EIB as well. 8 '
Even if the expression "financial interests of the Community" should include bodies with independent budgets and resources, the Banks' argued that Article 280 EC only allows the
Council to adopt measures combating fraud at the level of Member States.' 8 9 Also on this point, both the Advocate General and
the ECJ refused to restrict Article 280(4) EC to measures applying only to Member States as in 280(1) and (2) EC, 90 concluding that such a reading would be incompatible with the objectives sought by that article.' 9 1 The ECJ found that the legislature
- at 9 122-23 (holding that EIB falls within scope of Regulation 1073/1999). See, e.g.
Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8, O.J. C 325/33, at 42 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 81
(ex Article 4a) (establishing ECB and ESCB and stating that ECB must act within limits
of EC Treaty); id. art. 9, O.J. C 325/33, at 42 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 81 (ex Article 4b)
(establishing EIB); id. art. 105(1), O.J. C 325/33, at 75 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex
Article 105) (requiring ECB to support Community's objectives); id. art. 2, O.J. C 325/
33, at 40 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 80 (ex Article 2) (stating objectives of Community as
obtaining monetary union and non-inflationary growth); id. art. 4, OJ. C 325/33, at 41
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 80 (ex Article 3a) (adding that Community's activities also include
fixing exchange rates aimed at greater price stability and explains that monetary policy
conducted by ECB must support "general economic policies of the Community"); id.
art. 267, O.J. C 325/33, at 139-40 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 132 (ex Article 198e) (requiring
EIB to contribute to interest of Community).
187. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 92 (deciding that ECB falls
within scope of Regulation 1073/1999). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4,
art. 2, OJ. C 325/33, at 40 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 80 (ex Article 2) (stating objectives of
Community as obtaining monetary union and non-inflationary growth).
188. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 95 (concluding that scope of
Regulation 1073/1999 includes ECB). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at
125 (sustaining that EIB falls within scope of Regulation 1073/1999).
189. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at
98 (claiming that Article
280(4) EC must be read in relation to other provisions of that section). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
129 (submitting that Article 280(4) EC
intended only to allow Community to adopt measures combating fraud within Member
States).
190. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 280(1) and (2), O.J. C 325/33,
at 145-46 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79 (ex Article 209a) (allowing Member States to take measures combating fraud).
191. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 99 100-05 (rebutting contention that Council is only able to adopt fraud prevention measures effecting Member
States). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Central Bank, [2003]
E.C.R. -, at 9 106-112 (discussing wording, structure and history of Article 280 EC
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intended to extend OLAF's investigative authority to all the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Community. 9 2 Having determined that the scope of Regulation 1073/1999 applied
to the Banks, the ECJ then turned to the arguments of illegality.
2. Admissibility of the Objection of Illegality
The ECB argued for the illegality of Regulation 1073/1999
based on its right to challenge any legislation that effects it.19
As a preliminary point, the Commission pointed out that, under
that article, the ECB would be precluded from raising the objection of illegality because it did not do so within the two-month
period prescribed by Article 230 EC.1 94 When analyzing this provision of Article 230 EC, the ECJ has consistently held that if the
addressee of a decision adopted by the Community institutions
does not challenge the decision within the two-month time limit,
the decision becomes definitive against that person. 195 Advocate
and concluding that Community may adopt measures concerning fraud prevention
within its institutions and bodies); European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 7
131-35 (refuting contention that Council is only able to adopt fraud prevention measures effecting Member States); Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 9 131 (concluding that Article 280(4) EC allows Community to adopt fraud prevention measures in all Community institutions, bodies, agencies and offices).
192. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 67 (deciding ECB to be
within Scope of Regulation 1073/1999). See also European Investment Bank, [2003]
E.C.R. __, at 1 136 (holding EIB to be within Scope of Regulation 1073/1999); Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, recital 7 (extending OLAF's investigative functions to "all
the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies" (emphasis added)); Opinion of Advocate
GeneralJacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 54 (concluding ECB to be
within Scope of Regulation 1073/1999).
193. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 241, OJ. C 325/33, at 129
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 127 (ex Article 184) (ensuring right of any party to bring action
under Article 230 EC on grounds of infringement of essential procedural requirement
if instituted within two months).
194. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33, at 126
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 125 (ex Article 173) (allowing challenge to be brought within two
months from time Plaintiff is notified, or when Plaintiff gained knowledge of challenge). See also European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 72 (objecting to availability
of challenge of illegality of Regulation 1073/1999 based on statute of limitations of
bringing such action).
195. See National Farmers' Union v. Secretariat general du gouvernement, Case C241/01, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9079, 1 34 (citing Commission v Belgium, Case 156/77, [1978]
E.C.R. 1881, 71 20-24; Commission v Greece, Case C-183/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-3131, 9t 9
and 10; Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v. Commission and Germany, Case C-188/92,
[1994] ECR 1-833, 1 13; Nachi Europe GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Krefeld, Case C-239/99,
[2001] ECR 1-1197, 1 29).
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General Jacobs pointed out that these judgments aimed to protect legal certainty by disallowing Community measures to be
challenged indefinitely and individuals to avoid the time-limit as
a delay tactic.' 9 6 Despite the settled case law on this point, however, Jacobs tentatively concluded that the ECB's contention was
admissible.' 9 7
The ECJ took a more definitive stance than the Advocate
General and drew a subtle distinction between, on the one hand,
a decision not being challenged by the clear addressee of the
decision, and on the other, a decision not being challenged by a
party not known to be the addressee.' 9 8 Because the ECB did
not believe itself to be the addressee, it did not have the opportunity to challenge Regulation 1073/1999, and thus, the ECJ
held that the ECB might still bring a plea of illegality under Article 241 EC.' 9 9
The EIB took an offensive rather than defensive approach
on the issue of admissibility and argued that the Commission
could not challenge the EIB Anti-Fraud Decision under Article
237 EC, which provides that measures adopted by the EIB Board
of Governors may be challenged for annulment. 20 0 The EIB
196. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R.
- at 1 191 (citing Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, Commission v Spain, Case C258/89, [1991] ECR 1-3977, at
15-21; Opinion of Advocate General Roemer, Italy v
Council and Commission, Case 32/65, [1966] ECR 389, at 414; Opinion of Advocate
General Slynn, France v. Commission, Case 181/85, [1987] ECR 689, at 9 702-04;
Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, Greece v Council, Case 204/86, [1988] ECR
5323, at 6; Ami Barav, The Exception of Illegality in Community Law: A Critical Analysis,
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1974, 366; PIERRE DUBOIS, L'EXCEPTION D'ILLEGALITE DEVANT LA
COUR DE JUSTICE DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES 411 (Cahiers de Droit Europeen
1978); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 467, 531 (5th ed. 1992); KOEN LENAERTS & DIRK ARTS, PROCEDURAL
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 223 (1999).
197. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at 194 (allowing ECB to bring challenge of illegality even after running of statute
of limitations to bring such action).
198. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 19 74-77 (deciding ECB's contention of illegality of Regulation 1073/1999 was permissible within intention of statute
of limitations).
199. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 78 (clarifying time requirements of party challenging illegality of Community legislation).
200. See Commission v. European Investment Bank, Case C-15/00, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at 99 56, 60 (arguing that EC Treaty did not allow Commission to challenge EIB
anti-fraud decision). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 237(b), O.J. C
325/33, at 128 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 126 (ex Article 180) (allowing Commission to challenge measures adopted by EIB Board of Management, but not mentioning measures
adopted by EIB Management Committee).
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maintained that its Management Committee (which is not mentioned in Article 237 EC), not its Board of Governors, properly
adopted the decision. 20 ' The Advocate General and the ECJ,
however, attributed Management Committee decisions that have
legal effect to the Board of Governors and thus subjected such
20 2
decisions to review under Article 237 EC.
3. Duty to Consult the ECB

Arguing the illegality of Regulation 1073/1999, the ECB
first claimed that the Council and Parliament did not adopt the
regulation in a proper legal manner because neither institution
fulfilled its duty to consult the ECB before adopting such legislation. 2 " Article 105(4) EC requires the ECB to be consulted on
any proposed legislation falling within its "field of competence. '20 4 Although, fraud prevention is not listed as a primary
or even a secondary task of the ECB,2 ° 5 the right to organize its
internal affairs may arguably be considered in its fields of com201. See European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 60 (arguing that EC
Treaty did not allow Commission to challenge EIB anti-fraud decision because it was
adopted by EIB Management Committee). See also EIB Statute, supra note 38, art. 13,
1 3-8 (stating that EIB Management Committee, under authority of EIB President and
supervision of Board of Directors is responsible for current business of EIB).
202. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003]
E.C.R. _, at 1 74 (clarifying ability to challenge EIB decisions not made by EIB Board
of Management). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 67 (explaining ability to contest EIB decisions not made by EIB Board of Management); EIB Statute, supra note 38, art. 9.3(h) (making it EIB's Board of Governors' responsibility to
approve EIB's rules and procedures); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 237(b),
O.J. C 325/33, at 128 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 126 (ex Article 180) (allowing Commission to
challenge measures adopted by EIB Board of Management, but not mentioning measures adopted by EIB Management Committee). See generally Commission v. Council,
Case C-25/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1469, at 1 27 (concerning decisions of Committee of
Permanent Representatives).
203. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 106 (arguing that Council
did not follow proper procedures in adopting Regulation 1073/1999 because they
failed to consult ECB). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(4), O.J. C
325/33, at 75 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (setting consultation requirements when proposed legislation falls within ECB's "field of competence").
204. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 75
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (requiring ECB to be consulted on any proposed Community act falling within its "field of competence").
205. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(1), (2), O.J. C 325/33, at
75 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (listing ECB's primary objective as maintaining price stability, and secondary (or basic) tasks as designing Community Monetary
policy, conducting foreign exchange operations, managing foreign reserves, and promoting smooth payment systems).
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petence. 2 6 Therefore, the ECB maintained that when the
Council and the Parliament passed a regulation effecting the internal organization of the ECB, it was not valid because the ECB
was not consulted.2 °7
The ECJ agreed with Advocate General Jacobs on the purpose of the consultation provision in Article 105(4) EC. 20 ' Because the ECB, by virtue of its specific function in the Community, exhibits a high degree of expertise regarding monetary and
economic affairs, the duty to consult only ensures that the ECB is
utilized in passing such legislation. 20 9 Thus, the ECJ looked to
the role and the function of the ECB rather than its status to
determine when consultation is required by the EC Treaty and
concluded that, in this instance, the ECB's opinion is not required since the prevention of fraud does not fall inside its specific expertise. 2 t
4. Extent of ECB and EIB Independence
The Banks maintained as their second plea of illegality that
Regulation 1073/1999 violated their respective guarantees of independence. 2 11 This particular argument marked a crucial
206. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at i 108-09 (citing ESCB/ECB
statute, supra note 5, art. 12.3, 36 (granting Governing Council power to adopt Rules of
Procedure and lay down conditions of employment)). See also Wise, supra note 12, at
416 (noting that ECB's field of competence is generally considered to include only
monetary, prudential, banking, and financial matters).
207. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 11 108-09 (arguing that EC
Treaty requires consultation in ECB's field of competence and pointing out ESCB/ECB
statute, supra note 5, art. 12.3, 36 (granting Governing Council power to adopt Rules of
Procedure and lay down conditions of employment)).
208. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at I 110 (reading consultation
provision embodied in Article 105(4) EC as requirement to consult ECB only in areas
concerning monetary policy). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European
Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
140 (imputing intent of consultation provision in
Article 105(4) EC as only to utlilize ECB's expertise in adopting legislation affecting
economic and monetary policies).
209. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _,at I 110 (highlighting that consultation provision in Article 105(4) meant to ensure ECB was utilized in passing legislation in its "field of competence," and defining "field of competence" as solely issues
regarding monetary policy).
210. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 110 (concluding that EC
Treaty only requires ECB to be consulted when adopting legislation concerning monetary policy).
211. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 11 114, 118 (arguing that
ECB's guarantee of independence provided by EC Treaty does not allow OLAF to conduct internal investigations); Commission v. European Investment Bank, Case C-15/00,
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shaping point in EMU history regarding the ECB, because the
ECJ was given the opportunity to rule on the extent of ECB independence as provided by the EC Treaty, 2 12 whereas EIB autonomy has been developed in Community law in other contexts.2 13
To make analysis regarding the ECB easier, Advocate General Jacobs clarified the notion of ECB independence by dividing it into three main areas: institutional, personal, and financial.2 14 The institutional aspect of the ECB's independence is
embodied in its distinct legal personality,2" 5 its decision-making
freedom,2 1 6 its legislative ability217 and its power over its internal
[2003] E.C.R. __ at
88 (arguing EIB's autonomous status put it beyond reach of
OLAF). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (barring members of ECB decision-making
bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies);
ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 7 (repeating Article 108 EC).
212. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (protecting ECB decision-makers from potential political pressures when designing monetary policy and performing tasks set out in
Article 105 EC). See also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 7 (repeating Article 108
EC).
213. See Commission v. Council of Governors of the EIB, Case C-85/86, [1988]
E.C.R. 1281 (ruling on legal status of EIB and rejecting idea that EIB was third party to
Community). See also Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, Council of Governors of the
E/B, [1988] E.C.R. 1281 (noting that EIB was meant only to be independent in its decision-making, stating there is no doubt of nature of Bank as being autonomous segment
of "organizational machinery" of Community and that arguments to contrary have
much lower profile than Bank maintains, and noting significance of title and preamble
(if any) of piece of legislation for purposes of identifying its most characteristic subjectmatter); SGEEM and Roland Etroy v. EIB, Case C-370/89, [1992] E.C.R. 6211, at 15
(holding Community responsible for non-contractual liability of EIB, noting that with
regard to non-contractual liability term "institution" covers bodies such as EIB).
214. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R.
at 1 151-75 (discussing notion of ECB independence). See also Smits, supra note 7,
at 155-58 (using similar terminology); BINISMAGHI, supra note 7, at 119, 125-28 (distinguishing between Statutory, Functional, Economic and Personal Independence of
ECB).
-,

215. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 107(2), OJ. C 325/33, at 76
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 106) (giving ECB legal personality). See also ESCB/
ECB Statute, supra note 5, at art. 9.1 (reiterating legal personality provided for ECB).
216. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, OJ. C 325/33, at 77
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (barring members of ECB decision-making
bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies). See
also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 7 (repeating Article 108 EC).
217. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 110, O.J. C 325/33, at 77
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100-01 (ex Article 108a) (stating that ECB can adopt regulations,
decisions, recommendations and opinions considered necessary to carry out certain
tasks).
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organization. 2 1 The ECB's personal independence is derived
from the rules governing the appointment of the members of
the Executive Board and Governing Council, 1 9 the security of
tenure of these members 220 and the restriction barring these
members from engaging in external activities. 22 1 Finally, the
ECB enjoys financial independence in that it has control over its
own budget, 22 2 which is audited by independent external audionly the operational effitors2 2 3 who are limited to examining
22 4
ciency of the ECB management.
Under this reasoning, the ECB rightfully pointed out that
the EC Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute grant the ECB a considerable amount of freedom in carrying out its operations.2 2 5
218. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 12.3 (allowing ECB Governing
Council to adopt Rules of Procedure regarding internal organization of ECB). See also
id. art. 36.1 (providing that ECB Governing Council sets conditions of employment of
ECB staff).
219. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 112(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 78
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 101 (ex Article 109a) (providing that members of ECB Executive
Board and Governing Council are appointed by common accord of Member States for
non-renewable eight-year term).
220. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 11.4 (stating that members of ECB
Executive Board may only be removed from office for incapacity or "serious misconduct" in proceeding before ECJ).
221. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 11.1 (requiring members of ECB
Executive Board to perform their duties on full-time basis, precluding them from engaging in any other occupation).
222. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, arts. 26-33 (enumerating where ECB's
assets come from, how its assets are allocated and who controls its assets).
223. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 27.1 (stating that ECB's accounts
shall be audited by independent external auditors appointed by ECB Governing Council).
224. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 27.2 (outlining limitations of audits
performed by independent auditors).
225. See Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-1 1/00, [2003] E.C.R. _, at
114, 118 (highlighting ECB's strong statement of independence). See, e.g., Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex
Article 107) (barring ECB from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions, and barring Community institutions from seeking to influence ECB decision-makers); id., art. 105, O.J. C 325/33, at 75 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (setting
ECB's primary and secondary objectives); ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 11.4
(stating that members of ECB Executive Board may only be removed from office for
incapacity or "serious misconduct" in proceeding before ECJ); ESCB/ECB Statute,
supra note 5, art. 12.3 (allowing ECB Governing Council to adopt Rules of Procedure
regarding internal organization of ECB); SMrrs, supra note 7, at 92-115 (describing
complex provision on structure and role of ESCB and ECB). See also Goebel, supra note
6, at 276 (discussing similarity of ECB structure to German Bundesbank and U.S. Federal Reserve); Pohl, supra note 23, at 79, 85 (describing central bank without strong
independence is like "tiger without teeth").
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First, the ECB may determine its internal organization 2 26 and the
employment conditions of its staff,2 2 7 which, the ECB argued,
extends to the adoption of anti-fraud measures.22 8 Secondly, the
ECB highlighted its strict guarantee of freedom from political
influence 2 29 and submitted that the mere threat of potential investigations within the ECB had the potential to exert pressure
on the members of the Governing Council or the Executive
Board when making decisions. 2 0 Furthermore, because OLAF's
staff relies on the Commission for professional advancement and
budget constraints, their investigative authority might be used to
threaten the political independence of the ECB. 231 The ECB acknowledged that the likelihood of OLAF exerting pressure on
the ECB decision-makers was extremely small, yet the mere appearance of potential political pressure would shake the confidence in the ECB's ability to maintain economic stability in unstable financial markets. 23 2 Therefore, the ECB submitted that
226. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 11.4 (stating that members of ECB
Executive Board may only be removed from office for incapacity or "serious misconduct" in proceeding before ECJ).
227. See ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 36.1 (providing that ECB Governing
Council sets conditions of employment of ECB staff).
228. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 114 (arguing that adoption of
anti-fraud measures is part of adopting internal organization).
229. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
113-21 (pointing out that
ECB decision-makers are barred from being influenced politically). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex
Article 107) (barring members of ECB decision-making bodies from seeking or taking
instructions from Community institutions or bodies); ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5
(repeating Article 108 EC).
230. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 118 (suggesting potential for
political influence to be exerted on ECB decision-makers through OLAF investigations). See generally Harden, supra note 23, at 159-61 (pointing out policy motivation for
balancing independent central bank with removal from political pressures to enable
extensive leeway in developing monetary policy); Pohl, supra note 23, at 79, 85 (describing central bank without independence from political considerations as "tiger without
teeth"); SMITs, supra note 7, at 156 (describing motive for central bank independence
to be freeing incumbents from political considerations concerning renewal of his or
her term of office); Wise, supra note 12, at 415 (arguing that central bankers work more
efficiently when not influenced by partisan political pressures).
231. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 120-21 (suggesting potential
for political influence to be exerted on ECB decision-makers through OLAF investigations). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (protecting ECB decision-makers from being
influenced by political pressures); ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 7 (repeating
Article 108 EC).
232. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 119 (pointing out potential
for political influence to be exerted on ECB decision-makers through OLAF investiga-
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observance of its freedom from political pressure as provided by
from conthe EC Treaty required that OLAF be prohibited
233
ECB.
the
within
investigations
internal
ducting
Although the EIB's autonomy is not as firmly embedded in
the EC Treaty as that of the ECB, the EIB nonetheless pointed
out that it enjoys a distinct legal personality 234 with its own administrative bodies 2 35 and its own resources 236 thus leaving it out
of the reach of OLAF's investigative functions. 237 The EIB also
highlighted that the drafters of the EC Treaty recognized the
need for EIB autonomy and limited the control of the Court of
Auditors to the EIB's management over Community revenue
and expenditures, and left the EIB Audit Committee to manage
the other EIB activities. 238 As a policy consideration, the EIB
maintained that it is imperative that the EIB maintain its own
anti-fraud system in order to ensure investors that it is operating
in complete independence.2 3 9
tions although unlikely is still threat). See also Harden, supra note 23, at 159-61 (pointing out policy motivation for balancing independent central bank with removal from
political pressures to enable extensive leeway in developing monetary policy).
233. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 118 (suggesting OLAF investigations may be used as vehicle for exerting pressure on ECB decision-makers by political interests). See also Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at
77 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 100 (ex Article 107) (barring members of ECB decision-making
bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies). See
also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5 (repeating Article 108 EC)
234. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 266, O.J. C 325/33, at 139
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 132 (ex Article 198d) (stating that EIB shall have legal personality).
See also Report A5-0409, supra note 11 (stating that legal personality of EU implies that
Community may, as legal person, conclude agreements with non-member countries
and international organizations, be held liable under international law, and take action
where their rights are infringed).
235. See EIB Statute, supra note 38, art. 12 (providing administrative structure of
EIB).
236. See id. art. 4(1) (providing that EIB's capital shall be derived from subscription of Member States).
237. See Commission v. European Investment Bank, Case C-15/00, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at 89 (arguing that EIB autonomous status places it outside of OLAF's reach).
238. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 248(1),(3), O.J. C 325/33, at
131-32 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 128 (ex Article 188(c)) (limiting Court of Auditors control
to Community revenues and expenditures, and providing for on-the-spot audits only in
cases involving any body that manages such revenue or expenditure). See also EIB Statute, supra note 38, art. 14 (allowing Court of Auditors management authority over EIB
operations); European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 90.
239. See European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 92 (arguing that EIB autonomous status and reliance on consumer confidence demands EIB to be outside of
OLAF's reach).
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Advocate General Jacobs noted that, despite such far-reaching declarations of independence for the Banks, neither Bank is
completely removed from interacting and cooperating with the
institutions and other bodies of the Community. 240

The ECJ

agreed with the Advocate General in that the Banks' independence, albeit extensive, does not remove them from the European Community and exempt them from every rule of law.2 41
For example, both Banks must submit to judicial review by the
ECJ and the Court of Auditors. 242 The Court also pointed out
that the operations of both Banks must support and contribute
243
to the objectives of the Community whenever possible.

240. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Commission v. European Central
Bank, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 155 (holding ECB independence not to be
threatened by OLAF investigations). See also Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
117-18 (holding EIB autonomy or consumer confidence not to be threatened by OLAF investigations). EC Treaty enumerates several examples in which ECB must coordinate with Community institutions. See,
e.g., Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 111, O.J. C 325/33, at 78 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 101 (ex Article 109) (retaining in Council extensive authority in setting foreign exchange rate policy); id., art. 113, O.J. C 325/33, at 79 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 101-02
(ex Article 109b) (allowing President of Council and member of Commission to participate (without vote) in ECB's Governing Council meetings); Gormley & de Haan, supra
note 7, at 98 (noting Article 113 EC's similarity with status of Bundesbank, whose basic
law permits government ministers to attend Bundesbank meetings); SMITS, supra note 7,
at 171 (remarking that President of Council and member of Commission may "freely
opine on the right course of monetary policy."); Harden, supra note 23, at 153 (describing President of Council and member of Commission's role as contributing "to the
formulation of monetary policy by discussion."); Goebel, supra note 6, at 285-86 (discussing Article 113 EC).
241. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 135 (holding ECB independence not to be threatened by OLAF investigations). See also European Investment Bank,
[2003] E.C.R. -, at 102 (sustaining EIB autonomy does not remove bank from every
rule of law).
242. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 230, 232-34, 237, OJ. C 325/
33, at 126-28 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 125-26 (stating that ECJ has jurisdiction over disputes
between Community institutions, bodies and governments). See also ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art. 11.4 (allowing ECJ to compulsory retire, on application by ECB
Governing Council or Executive Board, member of Executive Board for "serious misconduct"); EIB Statute, supra note 38, art. 14 (allowing Court of Auditors management
authority over EIB operations).
243. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
124-25, and 135 (holding
ECB independence not to preclude its duty to support Community objectives). See, e.g.,
Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(1), OJ. C 325/33, at 75 (2002), 37 I.L.M.
at 99 (ex Article 105) (providing that ECB must, when price stability is not at issue,
support Community's objectives); id. art. 107(5), O.J. C 325/33, at 76 (2002), 37 I.L.M.
at 100 (ex Article 106) (providing that certain articles of ESCB/ECB Statute may be
amended by Council), id. art. 267, OJ. C 325/33, at 139-40 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 132 (ex
Article 198e) (providing that EIB must contribute towards Community's objectives);
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With a clearer image of the status of the ECB and EIB's independence, both the Advocate General and the ECJ agreed
that measures adopted by the Community legislature in the area
of fraud prevention such as Regulation 1073/1999 do not undermine the level of autonomy afforded to the Banks in carrying
out their assigned tasks. 44 Although OLAF is not an entirely
free body far removed from the Commission, it is also not directly subordinate or dependent on the Commission either.2 4 5
Specifically, OLAF is-completely independent from the Commission in carrying out its investigative functions,2 4 6 and must observe the rules of Community law, including the Protocol on the
privileges and immunities of the European Community. 24 7 Furthermore, the director of OLAF may only open an investigation
where there are "serious suspicions" and must equip inspectors
with written authority indicating the subject matter of the investigation. 248
A final point on the question of political independence, the
ESCB/ECB Statute, supra note 5, art 12.3 (allowing ECB Governing Council to adopt
Rules of Procedure determining ECB's internal organization); Commission v. Council
of Governors of the EIB, Case C-85/86, [1988] E.C.R. 1281 at 7 29 (stating that EIB is
intended to contribute towards attainment of Community's objectives and thus forms
part of Community framework).
244. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 137 (holding ECB independence not to be threatened by OLAF investigations). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 160 (deciding OLAF investigative authority does not compromise ECB independence from political considerations);
European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 7 104 (concluding EIB autonomy and
reliance on consumer confidence not to be threatened by OLAF investigations); Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
120
(sustaining that OLAF investigative authority does not usurp EIB autonomy or threaten
its consumer confidence).
245. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 139 (looking primarily to 4th,
10th, 12th, and 18th recitals of preamble, as well as Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12 of
Regulation 1073/1999). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Central
Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 7 161-64 (noting OLAF's considerable independence from
Commission in carrying out investigations); European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _,
at 1 106-09 (pointing out extensive independence OLAF enjoys from Commission
when carrying out investigations); Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at It 120-21 (highlighting OLAF's independence from
Commmission influence when conducting investigations).
246. See Decision 1999/352, supra note 3, art. 3 (modeling OLAF independence
on EC Treaty language conferring independence to Commission itself).
247. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (requiring OLAF to conduct
its investigations in conformity with requirements of EC Treaty).
248. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, art. 6(3) (specifying process of OLAF
commencing investigations).
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Advocate General and the ECJ both noted that OLAF's investigations must be carried out under the conditions of procedures
adopted by each institution. 24 9 Thus it is left to the Banks to
establish any restrictions they feel necessary in that regard by using the internal decision required by Regulation 1073/1999.250
5. The Principle of Proportionality
As a final contention of illegality, the EIB and ECB submitted that the application of Regulation 1073/1999 violated the
principle of proportionality. 25 1 The principle of proportionality
is embodied in Article 5 EC 25 2 and has been well-established
249. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 143 (noting that each Community institution and body is responsible for indicating specific requirements in regards to OLAF investigations). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
109 (highlighting that EIB is responsible for setting requirements regarding OLAF investigations); Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at 167 (pointing out that Regulation 1073/1999 requires each Community institution and body to determine specific requirements for internal OLAF investigations);
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1
122 (emphasizing requirement that each Community institution and body indicate specific requirements of internal OLAF investigations); Regulation 1073/1999, supra note
3, art. 4(6) (requiring each Community institution, body and agency to adopt internal
decisions allowing OLAF investigations).
250. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
143 (concluding that it is
each Community institution and body's responsibility to determine specific requirements regarding internal OLAF investigations). See also European Investment Bank,
[2003] E.C.R. -, at
109 (emphasizing the requirement of each Community institution and body to set individual requirements regarding interal OLAF investigations);
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 167
(reading requirement of each Community institution and body to draft internal decision allowing internal OLAF investigations as opportunity for Banks to specify any special requirements regarding such investigations); Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,
European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 122 (noting that Regulation 1073/1999
specifically allows each Community institution and body to provide for any specific requirements regarding internal OLAF investigations); Regulation 1073/1999, supra note
3, art. 4(6) (providing opportunity for each Community institution, body and agency to
specify particular requirements regarding OLAF investigations in internal decisions
adopted by each institution, body and agency).
251. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 146 (arguing that OLAF goes
beyond what is necessary to combat fraud within ECB because there are already adequate measures combating fraud within ECB). See also European Investment Bank, [2003]
E.C.R. -, at 1 150 (discussing measures already in place within EIB to combat fraud,
and noting that OLAF's presence is unnecessary because of these pre-existing measures).
252. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5, OJ. C 325/33, at 41-42
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 80 (ex Article 3b) (stating that Community action must not go
beyond what is "necessary" to achieve objectives of Community).
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through Community law. 25 3 The principle requires that Community measures must be appropriate for attaining the objective
and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
pursued
it. 2 5 4 The ECJ carefully pointed out that in areas such as this, the
legislature's assessment of what constitutes appropriate measures
will only be overruled when the measure is "manifestly inappropriate."1255
The Banks claimed, first, that OLAF's application would be
superfluous since there are already adequate controls for de253. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 156 (pointing out that principle of proportionality is firmly embedded in Community law). See also European Central
Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 161 (recognizing that principle of proportionality is common notion within Community law); Maizena Gesellschaft mbH and others v
Bundesanstalt fur landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung (BALM), Case 137/85, [1987]
15 (describing principle of proportionality as requiring government
E.C.R. 4587, at
action to not go beyond what is necessary to achieve objectives); Queen v. Secretary of
State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, Case C-491/01, [2002] E.C.R. 1-0000, at 122 (acknowledging that principle of
proportionality is general principle of Community law); ADM Oelmuhlen GmbH,
Oelwerke Spyk v. Biundesanstalt fur landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Case C-339/92,
[1993] ECR 1-6473, at 15 (using principle of proportionality to decide if government
action went beyond what was necessary to achieve its objective); Kaserei Champignon
Hofmeister GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, Case C-210/00, [2002]
ECR 1-0000, at 59 (referring to principle of proportionality as basic principle embedded in Community law).
254. See Baruch Bracha, ConstitutionalUpgrading of Human Rights in Israel: The Impact on Administrative Law, 3 U.PA.J.CoNsT.L. 581, at 638 n.285 (2001). In most legal
systems that recognize principle of proportionality, challenge under principle is subject
to three-prong test. Id. First prong asks whether there is compatibility between purpose and means; means must lead in rational manner to realization of purpose. Id.
Second prong asks if means injures individual to least possible extent. Id. Third prong
asks whether means is proper, if injury to individual is disproportionate to benefit,
which it achieves. Id. See also Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and Proportionalityfor Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 INLJ 567, at 582
(2003); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5, O.J. C 325/33, at 41-42 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 80 (ex Article 3b) (stating that Community action must not go beyond what is
"necessary" to achieve objectives of Community).
255. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 157 (indicating great deference given to governmental intent when passing legislation). See also British American
Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] E.C.R. 1-0000, at 1 123 (stating that
Community legislature must be allowed broad discretion when undertaking complex
58
assessments); United Kingdom v Council, Case C-84/94, [1996] ECR 1-5755 at
(deferring to legislature's intent in determining if action was necessary to achieve objective); Germany v Parliament and Council, Case C-233/94, [1997] ECR 1-2405 at 1 55
and 56 (allowing legislature to assess if action was necessary to achieve objective); Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 183 (adding that it is not for ECJ to overrule Community legislature when reviewing lawfulness
of general measures).
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tecting and preventing fraud within the Banks. 256 The ECB specifically pointed out that a team of independent auditors, nominated by the ECB's Governing Council and approved by the Eu25 7
ropean Council, examines all the ECB's books and accounts.
Additionally, the ECB's Governing Council already created an
internal and independent Anti-Fraud Committee to perform essentially the same functions as OLAF and its Supervisory Committee. 25 8 The EIB, likewise, claimed that the EIB's Audit Committee has access to the books, vouchers and other relevant documents for auditing the EIB's accounts and investigating fraud
and is thus already adequately protected from corruption in that
regard.2 5 9
On this point, the Advocate General and the ECJ gave great
deference to the legislature's view that it was necessary to set up
a centralized, specialized, uniform and independent entity to
conduct all fraud investigations throughout the Community institutions. 26 0 With this deference in mind, Jacobs and the ECJ
acknowledged the difference between the general control tasks
performed by the Court of Auditors and independent auditors
from the investigations conducted by OLAF: the latter are
256. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 147 (arguing that given high
degree of ECB independence and financial controls already provided, ECB should remain outside of OLAF's reach). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
155 (pointing out measures already in place for monitoring EIB operations).
257. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at
148 (highlighting Court of
Auditor's role in examining ECB's operational efficiency). See also ESCB/ECB Statute,
supra note 5, art. 27 (stating that ECB's accounts shall be audited by independent external auditors appointed by ECB Governing Council).
258. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at
149 (referring to ECB Decision, supra note 44).
259. See European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. __, at
156-58 (pointing out
Court of Auditor's function of managing Community revenue and expenditure that
would be similar to OLAF investigations). See also EIB Statute, supra note 38, art. 14
(allowing Court of Auditors management authority over EIB operations).
260. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 158 (deferring to Community
legislature's view over what is necessary to effectively combat fraud within Community).
See also Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. __, at
184 (pointing out that because ECB's Contested Decision was adopted after Regulation 1073/1999, former cannot render latter disproportionate); European Investment
Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
166 (giving great deferrence to Community legislature's
view of what is necessary to effectively combat fraud within Community); Opinion of
Advocate General Jacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 9 156 (allowing
Community legislatures to determine what is necessary to effectively combat fraud
within Community).
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aimed specifically at combating fraud and corruption. 261 Furthermore, the legislature is entitled to, and justified in its view
that internal control mechanisms such as the ECB Anti-Fraud
Committee, the EIB Audit Commit, and the Court of Auditors,
would not pursue fraud prevention with the same fervor or effec26 2
tiveness as a centralized, independent body such as OLAF.
The ECB also claimed that OLAF's investigations would be
stymied by the high degree of confidentiality required by ECB
operations and decisions, specifically in the areas of setting interest and exchange rates and determining monetary policy. 26 3 In
fact, the ECB contended that it should defer any investigation
pertaining to the tasks set out in Article 105 EC 2 6 4 to the D-LA
alone, making OLAF virtually ineffectual.2 6 5 Additionally, the
ECB highlighted that since OLAF's investigative authority does
not extend to the National Central Banks ("NCB"), where much
of the ECB's policies are carried out, it cannot combat fraud as
successfully as internal measures allowing joint audits between
these bodies.2 6 6
261. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 141, 159 (pointing out that
OLAF's functions, aimed specifically at fighting fraud and corruption, are in no way
similar to control tasks of Court of Auditors and independent auditors which follow
more rigid pattern). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Central
Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 184 (stating that task of auditing differs fundamentally in
nature from OLAF's tasks and controls); European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
167 (highlighing that OLAF's functions are different than those of Court of Auditors
and EIB Audit Committee); Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Investment
Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 157 (recognizing difference in Court of Auditor's role and
that of OLAF in regards to combating fraud within EIB).
262. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 160 (pointing out that OLAF
has authority to conduct internal investigations within Commission, but also external
investigations in Community bodies). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at 1 168 (noting that OLAF may well be more effective in combating fraud than
regular auditing functions of Court of Auditors and EIB Audit Committee).
263. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. ._, at 152 (pointing out difficulty of
OLAF being effective given ECB's required level of secrecy in operations).
264. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(1),(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 75
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 99 (ex Article 105) (listing ECB's primary objective as maintaining
price stability, and secondary (or basic) tasks as designing Community's Monetary policy, conducting foreign exchange operations, managing foreign reserves, and promoting smooth payment systems).
153 (emphasizing impor265. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at
tance of confidentiality in setting monetary policy and that high degree of secrecy
would render OLAF virtually useless).
266. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 11 154 and 155 (pointing out
that ECB's internal anti-fraud measures would be better equipped than OLAF to adapt
to ECB's unique role within Community).
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Neither the Advocate General nor the ECJ disputed the fact
that the ECB must maintain a high level of confidentiality in order not to compromise its specific tasks under the EC Treaty, but
rejected the idea that this would make OLAF ineffectual.2 6 7
First, OLAF's investigations are restricted to the procedures
adopted by each institution, 268 thus it is the ECB's responsibility
to establish any restrictions it feels necessary within that decision.269 Additionally, as Advocate General Jacobs pointed out,
Article 8 of Regulation 1073/1999 and Article 287 EC stipulate
strict professional secrecy by OLAF in its use and communication of any material obtained. 2 7 ' Thus, the objectives sought by
the creation of OLAF and their attainability justified Regulation
1073/1999 under the principle of proportionality. 2 71 Having exhausted all of the Banks' claims of illegality, the ECJ then examined whether the Contested Decisions infringed the provisions of Regulation 1073/1999.
B. Infringement of Regulation 1073/1999

Regulation 1073/1999, while requiring all Community institutions and bodies to consult each other and to adopt an inter267. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 11 162-63 (pointing out that
any special consideration that OLAF must make in regards to ECB investigations should
be specified in decision ECB adopts allowing OLAF to conduct such investigations). See
also Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
186 (stating that ECB internal decision will cover ECB unique situation during OLAF
investigations).
268. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, at art. 4(6) (referring to internal
decisions each Community institution, body and agency must adopt).
269. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 9 143 and 162 (explaining
each Community body's ability to adopt specialized requirements regarding OLAF's
investigations through internal decision). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,
European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
188 (noting that required internal decisions allow for any particular operational consideration regarding OLAF investigations).
270. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at
186 (noting level of secrecy required during OLAF investigations). See also
European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 163 (explaining OLAF's obligation of secrecy); Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3 (requiring OLAF to observe rules of professional secrecy); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 287, OJ. C 325/33, at 147
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 136 (ex Article 214) (requiring all Community servants not to disclose internal Community information).
271. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
164 (holding Regulation
1073/1999 to meet requirements under principle of proportionality). See also Opinion
of Advocate General Jacobs, European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at
189 (finding
OLAF's investigative authority to be within principle of proportionality).
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nal decision allowing OLAF to carry out internal investigations,
does not set a time limit for adopting such a decision. 272 Therefore, the question remained whether a Community body could
unilaterally adopt a separate decision conferring fraud investigation authority to an internal entity in lieu of granting such authority to OLAF. 2 7 3 If so, would such a decision infringe upon
Regulation 1073/1999?274

Since nothing in Regulation 1073/

1999 prevented the Banks from adopting their own mechanism
for combating fraud, and nothing in either Contested Decision
prevented OLAF from playing its role, the ECJ refined the question as whether the Banks' Contested Decisions could co-exist
with the prerogatives of Regulation 1073/1999.275
Advocate GeneralJacobs stated that neither Contested Decision was "per se contrary to Regulation 1073/1999,"276 but added that the institutions and bodies of the Community had a
duty not to undermine OLAF's effectiveness. 2 77 He concluded
that, although the Contested Decisions did not explicitly preclude Regulation 1073/1999, their application would render it
very difficult for OLAF to effectively perform its function.2 7 8 On
272. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, at art. 4(1) and (6) (referring to
internal decisions each Community institution, body and agency must adopt but not
setting specific time limit to adopt such decision).
273. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 17 166-86 (examining requirements of each institution and body in adopted internal decision allowing OLAF investigations). See also Commission v. European Investment Bank, Case C-15/00, [2003]
E.C.R. -, at It 178-87 (defining specific requirements of Regulation 1073/1999 for
each institution and body adopting internal decision to allow OLAF investigations).
274. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 77 166-86 (analyzing whether
ECB Anti-Fraud Decision infringes duty described in Regulation 1073/1999). See also
European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 178-87 (discussing infringement of
Regulation 1073/1999 by EIB Anti-Fraud Decision).
275. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 77 166-68 (asking if ECB AntiFraud Decision precluded objective sought by Regulation 1073/1999). See also European
Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at
179 (arguing that EIB Anti-Fraud Decision did
not infringe Regulation 1073/1999).
276. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R.
- at
73 (looking to whether ECB Anti-Fraud Decision rendered Regulation 1073/
1999 ineffectual).
277. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at 75 (clarifying ECB's duty to contribute to Community objectives by not undermining intent of Regulation 1073/1999).
278. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at 11 76, 88 (answering question whether ECB Anti-Fraud Decision is liable to undermine effectiveness of Regulation 1073/1999). See also Opinion of Advocate General
Jacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 100 (discussing whether EIB
Anti-Fraud Decision undermines effectiveness of Regulation 1073/1999).
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this point, the Commission directed attention to the intent of
both of the Contested Decisions.2 79 The EIB and the ECB specifically intended, the Commission claimed, to create an internal
system of fraud prevention in place of its obligation to adopt a

decision allowing OLAF to perform such functions.28

°

Both the Advocate General and the ECJ agreed with the
Commission, noting that in the case of the ECB's Decision, the
similarity of the recitals and provisions to those of Regulation
1073/1999 indicated that D-LA acted in place of OLAF. 281 Further, the ECB Decision required all staff to report any fraud or

illegal activity directly to D-LA, 28 2 not OLAF, and charged D-IA
with investigating all issues related to fraud,2 a3 thereby giving DIA a monopoly over fraud prevention within the ECB. 28 4 Finally,
the responsibility of a liaison with OLAF's Supervisory Committee rested with the ECB Anti-Fraud Committee,2 8 5 suggesting a
deliberate intention not to adopt the internal decision required

by Article 4(6) of Regulation 1073/1999.26
279. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 173 (pointing to intent of
ECB Anti-Fraud Decision to take place of OLAF). See also European Investment Bank,
[2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 183 (arguing that EIB Anti-Fraud decision intended to act in
place of OLAF).
280. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 11 174-75 (citing ECB Decision, supra note 44, at recitals 1, 3-8). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R.
-,
at 11 183-85 (noting that Part II of EIB Decision, supra note 45, expressly denies
OLAF investigative authority and preamble reflects EIB's intention to assume sole responsibility for fraud prevention).
281. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 177 (deciding ECB AntiFraud Decision intended to act in lieu of Regulation 1073/1999). See also Opinion of
Advocate GeneralJacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 87 (recognizing
that ECB Decision mirrors to great extent Regulation 1073/1999, in form and function).
282. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 5 (requiring ECB employees and officers
to report cases of fraud and turn over pertinent information to D-IA).
283. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, art. 2 (requiring D-IA to investigate all suspicions and incidences of fraud).
284. See European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 179-80 (concluding that ECB
D-IA had primary duty of fraud prevention within ECB). See also Opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs, European CentralBank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 77 (stating that ECB intended D-IA to be only control against fraud and to act in lieu of OLAF).
285. See ECB Decision, supra note 44, at art. 1(9) (charging only ECB Anti-Fraud
Committee with duty of interacting with OLAF).
286. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 1 178 (concluding that ECB
adopted its anti-fraud decision in lieu of adopting decision allowing OLAF to conduct
internal investigations). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, European Central
Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 1 86 (interpreting ECB's adoption of its anti-fraud decision
as precluding adoption of internal decision allowing OLAF to conduct internal investigations as required by Regulation 1073/1999).
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The ECJ followed Advocate General Jacobs and concluded
that the failure of Regulation 1073/1999 to set a time limit for
the adoption of the decisions referred to in Article 4(6)287 did
not negate the requirement to adopt such decision altogether
and that both the EIB and ECB passed their respective Contested Decisions in order to forgo this obligation thereby infringing Regulation 1073/1999.288 With that, the ECJ had rejected all
claims of illegality of Regulation 1073/1999 submitted by either
Bank, found both Contested Decisions to have infringed upon
the Regulation 1073/1999, and thus annulled both of the Banks'
Contested Decisions.28 9
III. CLEARING THE ROAD: CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF
JUDGMENT IN COMMISSION V. ECB
The depth of the fraud problem in the late 1980s and early
1990s called for far-reaching measures to combat irregularities
in the revenues and expenditures that affected the Community's
financial interests. 2 0 Thus, in 1999, OLAF was designed to fight
fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity throughout the
EC to protect the Community's financial interests. 29 ' The necessity of fighting fraud in the Community was paramount to the
continued success of the Monetary Union and thus it was'inevitable that OLAF would be given incredible leeway in pursuit of its
objectives.29 2
287. See Regulation 1073/1999, supra note 3, at art. 4(6) (referring to internal
decisions each Community institution, body and agency must adopt).
288. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. __, at 11 181-82 (concluding that
ECB Anti-Fraud Decision infringed upon Regulation 1073/1999). See also Opinion of
Advocate General Jacobs, European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 88 (finding that
ECB Anti-Fraud Decision infringed Regulation 1073/1999); Commission v. European
Investment Bank, Case C-15/00, [2003] E.C.R. __, at 1 186 (concluding that EIB AntiFraud Decision infringed upon Regulation 1073/1999); Opinion of Advocate General
Jacobs, European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 100 (finding that EIB AntiFraud Decision infringed upon Regulation 1073/1999).
289. See European Central Bank, [2003] E.C.R. -, at 186 (annulling ECB AntiFraud Decision). See also European Investment Bank, [2003] E.C.R. _, at 187 (annulling EIB Anti-Fraud Decision).
290. See supra note 2, 56, 63 and accompanying text (discussing level of fraud
within Community and citing specific examples of measures taken by Community Institutions to combat fraud).
291. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing Decision 1999/352 establishing OLAF).
292. See supra notes 3, 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing measures taken
to combat fraud including Interinstitutional Agreement between Commission, Council
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A. Giving Fraud Prevention The Right-of-Way

The Court of First Instance yielded to fraud prevention
when it had the opportunity to rule on the extent of OLAF's
investigative authority with respect to members of the European
Parliament ("MEPs"). 29 3 The Parliament, following the interin-

stitutional agreement of May 25, 1999,294 amended its Rules 29of5
Procedure to allow OLAF to conduct internal investigations.
Certain MEPs feared that the amendment did not adequately
protect their privacy and worried that OLAF could request and
gain access to their offices in their absence and without their
consent in order to gather information.2 9 6 On this claim, the
Court of First Instance affirmed that neither the Protocol on the

Privileges and Immunities nor the Parliament's amended Rules
of Procedure provided any specific guarantee of the rights of
MEPs, and therefore denied the MEPs
29 7
amendment.

claim to annul the

Additionally, the ECJ afforded OLAF tremendous latitude
when it did not reserve any special immunity for itself regarding
its internal decision allowing OLAF investigations.2 98

On Octo

ber 26, 1999, the ECJ adopted a decision to allow OLAF full access to all documents and information, except those related to a
lawsuit. 299 The only requirement under that decision is that the
and Parliament as well as ECJ Decision allowing OLAF to conduct internal investigations and ruling of Court of First Instance regarding Parliament's internal decision and
Parliament Members' privacy).
293. See supra notes 3, 127 and accompanying text (discussing case brought by
members of Parliament challenging OLAF's ability to conduct internal investigations
without Parliament Members' permission).
294. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing nature of interinstitutional agreements, and Interinstitutional Agreement between Commission, Council
and Parliament to adopt internal decision allowing OLAF to conduct investigations
within each institution).
295. See supra notes 3, 127 and accompanying text (discussing case brought by
members of Parliament challenging OLAF's ability to conduct internal investigations
without Parliament Members' permission).
296. See supra notes 3, 127 and accompanying text (discussing case brought by
members of Parliament challenging OLAF's ability to conduct internal investigations
without Parliament Members' permission).
297. See supra notes 3, 127 and accompanying text (discussing case brought by
members of Parliament challenging OLAF's ability to conduct internal investigations
without Parliament Members' permission).
298. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's adoption of internal decision allowing OLAF authority to conduct internal investigations).
299. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's adoption of internal decision allowing OLAF authority to conduct internal investigations).
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registrar of the ECJ must serve as the intermediary to OLAF, but
the duty to cooperate with OLAF is binding on all ECJ employ3 00
ees.
Despite the ECJ's willingness to adopt a decision allowing
OLAF to conduct internal investigations and not reserve any particular privileges for itself in that regard, the ECB and the EIB
still felt that they were outside the scope of Regulation 1073/
1999.301 In one of the leading studies on the nature and operations of the ECB, Chiara Zilioli and Martin Selmayr (both ECB
staff-members) have contended that the self-image of the ECB as
completely separate from the rest of the Community fuels attempts to maximize their own autonomy. 30 2 For the ECB, this
self-image is substantiated by the strong language in the EC
Treaty providing its independence. 3
B. ECB Independence: Roadblock Or Bump In The Road
A successful Monetary Union between disparate Member
States hinged on a strong independent central bank at the core
of policy development and implementation. 3 4 Although
modeled on the operational independence of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States and the German Bundesbank,
the ECB's independence is unique because it is embodied in the
EC Treaty as a "constitutional principle." 0 5 This constitutional
level of independence reflects the view that the strength of the
ECB largely depended on its removal from potential political
pressures both from Member States and from political institu300. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's adoption of internal decision allowing OLAF authority to conduct internal investigations).
301. See supra notes 44, 45, 128 and accompanying text (mentioning ECJ Decision
allowing OLAF to conduct internal investigations, and ECB and EIB Decisions for antifraud decisions not granting OLAF same authority).
302. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of central bank
with extensive independence and recognizing that self-image of ECB as separate from
rest of Community adds to attempts to maximize its autonomy).
303. See supra notes 12-29, 31 and accompanying text (discussing so-called constitutional independence of ECB afforded by EC Treaty, concerns of extensive central bank
independence and recognizing that self-image of ECB as separate from Community
adds to attempts to maximize its autonomy).
304. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing impressive track-record of
Bundesbank and U.S. Federal Reserve in maintaining price stability and pointing out
policy considerations for central bank with strong statement of independence).
305. See supra notes 5, 30 and accompanying text (noting that ECB's so-called constitutional independence gives it greater independence than either U.S. Federal Reserve or Bundesbank).
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tions. 306
Germany advocated a central bank with considerable independence because of the undeniable success of the Bundesbank
in delivering a stable and solid currency coupled with low inflation. 0 7 Former Bundesbank President Pohl argued that strong
independence afforded central banks the freedom to follow a
rigid monetary policy without persuasion from fickle public
opinion.3 °8 Economists Lorenzo BiniSmaghi and Daniel Gros
supported this view with empirical research, showing that independent central banks on average have enjoyed more success at
maintaining price stability than those with less independence
from political influence. 0 9 Thus, the specific wording of Article
105 EC states that the ECB shall control the monetary policy of
the Community, not for the Community," 0 indicating that the
Community is not liable for ECB actions and that the ECB is the
master of its domain.3 1 l Further, the ECB is absent in the list of
13
3 12
it enjoys a distinct legal personality,
community institutions,
it maintains legislative authority,3 14 it has an independent
budget, 1 5 and it is "constitutionally" protected from outside in306. See supra note 23, 30 and accompanying text (pointing out policy motivation
for ECB independence and freedom from political influence as enabling required leeway in developing successful monetary policy and conceding that ECB has greater independence than either U.S. Federal Reserve or Bundesbank).
307. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing impressive track-record of
Bundesbank and U.S. Federal Reserve in maintaining price stability and pointing out
policy considerations for central bank with strong statement of independence).

308. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting benefits of independent
central bank)
309. See supra note 7, 23 and accompanying (citing studies that correlate central
bank independence in Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland with low inflation rates
and smaller national deficits and noting that central bankers work more efficiently
when not influenced by partisan political pressures).
310. See supra notes 16, 18 and accompanying text (discussing Article 105 EC,
which enumerates primary and secondary tasks of ECB).
311. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing varying views of extent of
ECB independence).
312. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (listing institutions of Community).
313. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting significance of having legal
personality).
314. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (stating that ECB can adopt regulations, take decisions, make recommendations, and deliver opinions considered necessary to carry out certain tasks).
315. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing source of ECB revenues).
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fluence in its decision-making. 3 16
The former President of the European Monetary Institute,
Alexandre Lamfalussy, himself concluded that ECB independence underpins the credibility and effectiveness of a successful
monetary union and is paramount for the maintenance of price
stability in the euro-zone. 17 Lamfalussy did add, however, that
the ECB's concurrent objective to support the general economic
policies of the Community must still be observed.31 8 Others op
posed to the idea of total ECB autonomy argued that the EC
Treaty's strong advocacy of independence did not describe the
ECB's status but rather represented simply a "technical consideration" aimed solely at the objective of maintaining price stability.
St.319

They argued that the ECB is not an absolutely autonomous
body outside the reach of the rest of the Community, but rather
its independence is restricted to its specific enumerated tasks.32 °
Article 105 EC supports this because it states that the ECB, while
not sacrificing its objective of price stability, must concurrently
support the objectives of the Community.3 2' In any action
outside of the ECB's primary objective - maintaining price stability - the ECB's involvement and support within the Community is at least as important as its primary objective. 2 2 The EC
Treaty provides further evidence that the ECB resides within the
Community framework by requiring its interaction with other
Community institutions and bodies.3 2 3
316. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing ECB independence as
"constitutional principle" and ECB decision-maker's removal from political influence).
317. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations of
drafters of EC Treaty).
318. See supra notes 23, 30 and accompanying text (observing that this aim of price
stability as constitutional principle represents more unambiguous ranking of aims of
monetary policy than is found even in Germany).
319. See supra notes 31 and accompanying text (discussing varying views of extent
of ECB independence).
320. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (stating that ECB must be accountable to political institutions and come under scrutiny ofjudiciary).
321. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting provisions enumerated in
Article 105 EC).
322. See supra notes 23, 31 and accompanying text (discussing motivation for ECB
independence and varying views regarding extent of ECB independence).
323. See supra notes 184, 186-87, 240 and accompanying text (concluding that
ECB, as central body charged with designing Community's monetary policy, in particular, plays unique role within Community framework, and discussing provisions that require ECB to coordinate with other institutions of Community and those that state
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First, many of the ECB's objectives are shared by the whole
Community and necessarily require close cooperation.3 24 For
example, Article 2 EC specifically enumerates the tasks of the
Community and includes establishing an economic and monetary union, implementing policies to achieve certain economic
goals and sustaining low-inflationary growth.3 25 Article 4 EC
adds that the Community's activities also include fixing exchange rates aimed at greater price stability. 326 Article 4 EC describes the monetary policy that is conducted by the ECB and
notes that it also must support the Community's general economic policies.3 2 7

Second, it must not be overlooked that EC Treaty of Maastricht, in which the role of the ECB was set forth, comprises a
series of amendments to the initial "EC Treaty Establishing the
European Community.3 128 The Monetary Union was not created
as a separate structure under the overarching EC Treaty on European Union such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
also created by the EC Treaty of Maastricht. 29 Rather the formation of a Monetary Union, with the ECB as its hub, was explicitly mentioned as one of the objectives of the Community. 3 ° It
is important not to give this fact too much weight,3 3 1 but it has
been argued that the ECB's connection with the EC is more than
objectives of Community, including obtaining monetary union and non-inflationary
growth and those adding that Community's activities include fixing exchange rates
aimed at greater price stability and that monetary policy conducted by ECB must support general economic policies of Community).
324. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing provisions that require
coordination between ECB and Community institutions and bodies).
325. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing provision that states
Community objectives, including obtaining monetary union and non-inflationary
growth).
326. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (noting that Community's activities
include fixing exchange rates aimed at greater price stability and that monetary policy
conducted by ECB must support general economic policies of Community).
327. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (noting that Community's activities
include fixing exchange rates aimed at greater price stability and that monetary policy
conducted by ECB must support general economic policies of Community).
328. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (indicating title of EC Treaty).
329. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (enumerating provisions on common
foreign and security policy).
330. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing Community objectives,
including obtaining monetary union and non-inflationary growth).
331. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing Advocate General Mancini's view of importance of title (if any) of piece of legislation for purposes of identifying its most characteristic subject-matter).
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just a functional proximity.3 3 2
Third, close cooperation is notjust suggested but is actually
required in certain situations. For example, Article 111 EC preserves in the Council extensive authority over setting foreign exchange rate policy that is binding on the ECB.3 3 Additionally,
Article 113 EC allows the President of the Council and a member of the Commission to "participate" (without a vote) in the
ECB's Governing Council meetings. 3 4 The term "participate"
implies the ability to speak and offer opinions, not just to attend
in silence. 3 5 Taken together, the measures that confer the ECB
with a high level of independence and those restricting its ability
to act alone outside of the Community reflect the desire to protect the ECB's primary objective from short-sighted political
agendas while also allowing for a certain degree of accountability
to the Community and to the Member States. 3 6
Fourth, in 1990, the Commission acknowledged the importance of ensuring democratic accountability of the ECB in order
to make monetary policies more palatable to the public.33 7 Ten
years later, Christa Randzio-Plath, then Chair of the Committee
on Monetary and Economic Affairs in the European Parliament,
professed that the ECB's unprecedented level of independence
must be counterbalanced by an equally high level of accountability. 338 Holding the ECB to the same standard of transparency as
other Community institutions and bodies in the field of fraud
prevention strengthens its accountability and, accordingly, its
332. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (pointing to title of EC Treaty as
indication of drafters' intent to define all aspects of Community, including ECB as part
of Community).
333. See supra notes 18, 240 and accompanying text (describing ECB's position in
setting foreign exchange rate policy "somewhere between consultation and assent").
334. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing examples of EC Treaty
drafters' intent of including ECB within Community framework).
335. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (noting this provision's similarity
with status of Bundesbank, whose basic law permits government ministers to attend
Bundesbank meetings and that President of Council and member of Commission may
offer opinions on right course of monetary policy in order to contribute to formulation
of monetary policy through discussion).
336. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing various views of ECB
independence and problem of accountability and democratic deficit).
337. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (mentioning several concerns regarding ECB independence and potential for democratic deficit and describing possible considerations when granting such strong statement of independence).
338. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (highlighting debates around ECB
independence versus ECB democratic accountability).
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credibility.33 9
The exact status of the ECB within the Community was
largely debated and the ECJ, by virtue of the EC Treaty, had the
authority to definitively define ECB independence.3 4 ° Fortunately, the urgency of combating fraud combined with the ECB's
efforts to confirm its autonomy provided the conflict necessary
for the ECJ to clarify the status of the ECB and the extent of its
independence.3 1 This crucial point in EMU development also
marked the authority vested in the ECJ to answer this question.3 4 2 Not surprisingly, the ECJ seized this opportunity for two
reasons: to build confidence in its role of judicial review and to
enhance the overall confidence in the EMU by making clear the
roles of its governing bodies. 43
C. The ECJ ForgingA Path For Progress
As a check on the ECB's considerable independence the EC
Treaty vested the ECJ with the power of judicial review.3 44 The
necessity of fraud prevention set the stage for the ECJ to exercise
its judicial review authority by ruling on the extent of ECB independence and solidifying its position to resolve such disputes.34 5
Conceding the interpretation that the Banks exist within the
Community framework and given the Community Judiciary's
willingness to support fraud prevention within the Community,
it is not surprising that the ECJ found the Banks to be within
OLAF's investigative reach.3 4 6 Consistent with this finding, it
339. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing potential for democratic
deficit regarding ECB accountability).
340. See supra notes 6, 32, 42 and accompanying text (stating that ECJ has jurisdiction over disputes between Community institutions, bodies and governments).
341. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (citing Commission's respective
cases against ECB and EIB for failing to adopt decision allowing OLAF to conduct internal investigations).
342. See supra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text (discussing potential for democratic deficit regarding ECB accountability and power vested in ECJ to resolve such
issues).
343. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting ECJ's authority to resolve
issues between Community institutions and bodies).
344. See supra notes 6, 32 and accompanying text (citing Commission v. ECB and
ECJ's authority to resolve issues between Community institutions and bodies and discussing importance of its authority of judicial review).
345. See supra notes 6, 32, 42 and accompanying text (highlighting ECJ's authority
to resolve issues between Community institutions and bodies and discussing importance
of its authority of judicial review).
346. See supra notes 183-88, 240-41, 243 and accompanying text (explaining ECB's
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also is not surprising that the ECJ found that the duty to consult
the ECB was restricted only to legislation in its field of expertise
and thus the Council and Parliament did not violate this duty by
adopting anti-fraud measures that affect the ECB. 4 7 Although
the ECJ's decisions in this regard were perhaps not surprising,
the future of the EMU will benefit by having an authoritative
answer to the question of the extent of ECB and EIB independence and the Banks' respective roles within the Community.
Furthermore, the ECJ demonstrated the extensive leeway
the Community is willing to grant fraud prevention by adopting
its own internal decision allowing OLAF investigations and narrowly defining ECB independence in favor of the fight against
fraud. 4 By clarifying the Banks' status and OLAF's reach, the
ECJ increased Member State confidence in the EMU and by exercising its authority to resolve conflicts among EMU institutions
the ECJ added credit to its role in the judicial review process.
CONCLUSION
As Lord Acton succinctly stated, "power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." With this mantra in mind, the
ECJ rightly concluded that ECB independence should be restricted to its stated area of expertise: designing and implementing monetary policy. Likewise, EIB autonomy should extend
only to its role within the Community framework: contributing
to the balanced and steady development of the common market
of the Community. The roles, privileges and checks on power of
the central institutions and bodies created under the EC Treaty
will evolve and become more clearly defined over time. There is
no doubt that the recent decisions in Commission v. European Central Bank and Commission v. European Investment Bank are part of
the evolution of the European Community framework. The ECJ
has added an important limit to the ECB's constitutional indeexistence within Community framework and concluding that scope of Regulation
1073/1999 extends over all institutions and bodies within that framework).
347. See supra notes 16, 18, 208-10, 240-41, 243 and accompanying text (pointing
out duties of ECB provided by EC Treaty, defining ECB's "field of competence" and
holding fraud prevention not part of ECB's area of expertise).
348. See supra notes 3, 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing measures taken
to combat fraud including Interinstitutional Agreement between Commission, Council
and Parliament as well as ECJ Decision allowing OLAF to conduct internal investigations and ruling of Court of First Instance regarding Parliament's internal decision and
Parliament Members' privacy)
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pendence and also added credibility to its authority of judicial
review. The Community is moving forward and progress has resumed.

